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FORMERLY COUNTERSPY

The National Reporter

Vol. No. 1 Winter 1985

SOUTH AFRICA'S

PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

SECRET

U.S. "Exercises" in Honduras

◆ CIA at Tufts University

Welcome to The National Reporter

With this issue, *The National Reporter* makes its debut as the successor to *Counterspy* magazine. *The National Reporter* will incorporate the best of *Counterspy* while expanding the magazine's vision to address a wider range of the pressing issues facing the United States and the world at large.

The National Reporter will continue to report on the CIA and the intelligence agencies. These agencies' demonstrated capabilities to undermine the existence of the U.S. as a constitutional democracy makes such coverage essential. At the same time, we shall cover U.S. domestic and foreign policies and take on such issues as nuclear weapons, threats to the environment, the national deficit, the debt crisis, and corporate abuse and corruption. We shall also suggest with each issue constructive solutions and options. We emphasize the word "suggest" because we eschew rigid dogmatic philosophies, and we welcome input and criticisms from you, our readers.

Our coverage will be based on well-documented, in-depth investigations. These raw reports will then be put into articles which will take into account the human and personal elements in these stories when feasible.

We should mention that our reporters have proven journalistic credentials. They have worked as reporters, investigators, and consultants for CBS, ABC, Cable Network News, National Public Radio, Canadian Broadcasting Company, and the British Broadcasting Corporation, both television and radio. Our reporters have written for, and/or contributed to, every major publication in the U.S. and Europe including: the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *Newsday*, the *Boston Globe*, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, the *San Francisco Examiner*, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Des Moines Register*, the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, the Associated Press, United Press International, the *International Herald Tribune*, the *Toronto Star*, the *Manchester Guardian*, the *London Times*, *Le Monde*, and *Le Monde Diplomatique*. *The National Reporter* journalists have received several reporter awards; they have authored many books and studies, and editor John Kelly is chair of the Intelligence Study Group of the American Political Science Association and a correspondent for the *AfricAsia* magazine.

This first issue of *The National Reporter* takes a special look at South Africa. In recent months, the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. has been re-ignited with strong protests cropping up across the country while divestment campaigns continue. So it is particularly fitting to present Murray Waas' article which exposes apartheid's agents and operations in the U.S. and even in the media and on Capitol Hill, all aimed at buying a better public image for South Africa. Awareness of these facts may help prevent the South African government from secretly undercutting the anti-apartheid movement.

But despite anti-apartheid activists' best efforts to push the South African government to change, as Robert Shephard's article reveals, South Africa has an invaluable fallback. Gold, as the article documents, is the linchpin of apartheid, providing 21 percent of state revenues. This fact means it may be necessary to boycott South Africa's gold or affect its price on the market, before South Africa will give up its racist system of apartheid. This possibility, of course, has to be weighed vis-a-vis the price to Black workers in South Africa and the sacrifices such an action would require.

Also in this first issue, John Kelly — using secret U.S. government documents — reports on the militarization of Honduras by the Pentagon. Josh Cohen also looks at Central America, pinpointing the warlike and dehumanizing policies and activities of the U.S. government there. Cohen then presents a concrete, alternative course for Central America which could benefit the peoples of both Central America and the U.S. But *The National Reporter* does not consider Cohen's presentation the last word on the terrible crisis and suffering in Central America. For that reason, we welcome reader responses. These two articles provide a model for *The National Reporter's* exposes: hard documentation (in Kelly's article, the U.S. government's own secret words) coupled with constructive options for public debate.

We're excited about *The National Reporter* and hope you check us out and let us know what you think!

A note to our subscribers: *The National Reporter* will be sent to you for the full term of your subscription to *Counterspy*. We would also like to thank those who generously contributed last month in response to our appeal for financial help.

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A Zap In Every Pot

By Kitty Tucker

The Department of Energy (DOE) wants to play the fairy tale Rumpelstiltskin with a new twist. Rumpelstiltskin turned straw into gold; the DOE wants to turn its nuclear weapons waste into a saleable product by using it for "food irradiation."

Food irradiation with gamma sources like Cesium-137 (produced as a by-product of creating fissionable materials for nuclear weapons) was first proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the military in the late 1950s. Initial efforts to sterilize food and preserve it for years for military use had to be abandoned because of adverse effects on the flavor, odor, texture and appearance of foods. At the time, optimistic nuclear promoters claimed they could build nuclear powered airplanes and heat homes with nuclear furnaces that would even melt snow off the sidewalks.

But at the time, the food processing industry was not interested, so most research and development had to be supported by the military or various atomic energy agencies.

The recent EDB problems, leading to the withdrawal of its use as a food preservative, seemed an ideal opportunity to promote food irradiation as a substitute for chemical processing. Margaret M.

Heckler, Secretary of Health & Human Services, approved proposed Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations for publication on February 14, 1984. This proposal will eliminate the irradiation labeling requirements for consumers. Apparently, the food industry fears that the public will not want to buy foods labeled as irradiated.

The regulations proposed by the FDA would allow the irradiation of fruits, vegetables and grains with doses of radiation up to 100,000 rads. A dose of about 400 rads is enough to kill half of the people exposed to it. These doses will inhibit sprouting in onions or potatoes and kill insects in the foods, though they are not high enough to sterilize the foods. Critics of the proposal have raised concerns about the safety of eating irradiated foods over a lifetime, potential environmental impacts, and safety in the radiation industry.

Under current regulations, food irradiation is treated as a food additive. Labels are required to state "Treated with ionizing radiation" or "Treated with gamma radiation." The FDA proposal would eliminate labeling requirements, legalizing the secret irradiation of our foods. Cautious consumers would be unable to avoid irradiated foods.

Questions have been raised about the


research on the safety of food irradiation. Some studies, for example, have shown problems in test animals used in these studies.

For over 25 years, the U.S. government, principally through the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps, performed the bulk of the research on irradiated foods. In April 1984, Sanford Miller, the food safety chief of the FDA, told the Research and Development Association (a private group which processes food for the military) that only three studies done over the past 25 years by the Army on sterilizing meats met FDA criteria for acceptable research. Even these three studies were questionable, according to Miller.

The credibility of the research on food irradiation is of particular concern because many of the studies were done by the Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc. (IBT). In 1983, IBT officials were found guilty of defrauding the government in drug research. The government uncovered such problems as the lack of routine analyses, premature deaths of thousands of rodents due to unsanitary lab conditions, faulty record keeping, and suppression of unfavorable findings.

Earlier, on October 7, 1977, the Army declared two out of three IBT animal feeding studies in default. At the time, IBT held contracts totalling more than \$8 million for animal feeding studies on beef, ham, and pork. Thus, the data from these two studies on the effects of eating irradiated foods were useless. The third study which was not held in default found reduced numbers of offspring, decreased survival of weaned offspring, and greater numbers of tumors in animals fed irradiated foods. Even this study was flawed with poor record keeping. In effect, this leaves unanswered the vital question of the deleterious effects of eating irradiated foods.

At the FDA proposed levels of irradiation, there should be no induced radiation in foods. But irradiating foods at sufficiently high energy levels with machine sources of radiation can make food components radioactive. Moreover, studies conducted in India revealed that irradiation of foods stimulates the production of aflatoxins in the foods. Some aflatoxins are known to be up to 1000 times as toxic as EDB and are potent cancer-causing agents. This



Under a proposed Food and Drug Administration regulation, food irradiated in facilities like the one above will be sold without a label warning consumers they are buying irradiated food.

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finding seriously questions the suitability of replacing EDB with food irradiation.

There is, furthermore, the danger arising from greatly increasing the volumes of highly dangerous radioactive byproducts on U.S. highways near population centers and food growing areas. For example, there are plans to build a food irradiator in Hawaii at the Honolulu International Airport. One food irradiation facility using a 3 million curie radicesium source could have a radiation through-put every five years of 450,000 curies going in and out of the plant. This is about five times greater than the total volume of low-level radioactive wastes generated in 1981 in the U.S. from all sources. This is a particularly critical problem in the absence of effective regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, the Department of Transportation, and the states. Concern over this problem has prompted over 200

local communities to ban or restrict nuclear cargo transportation in defiance of federal preemption.

Widespread use of large quantities of radioactive materials will also increase the hazards faced by workers in the food processing industries. A worker at Radiation Technology in New Jersey accidentally opened the door to a radiation chamber for sterilization of medical equipment in 1977 and received a dangerous dose in excess of 200 rads. The accident occurred because management violated license requirements to use interlock and safety devices. The same company was cited by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for dumping radioactive garbage with the regular trash, failing to set up access barriers to protect workers, and allowing radioactive isotopes to leak into pool water. State officials also charged Radiation Technology with contaminating local

water supplies with toxic chemicals.

With so many questions about the integrity of those researching food irradiation, as well as those who carry out the actual process, extreme caution in moving forward on food irradiation is the most prudent course. But with Secretary Heckler favoring the food irradiators, consumers may have to look toward Congress for protection from the combined efforts of the Reagan administration, the nuclear weapons producers, and the radiation industry. ■

Kitty Tucker is the president of the Health and Energy Institute. She testified before the House Agriculture Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture regarding food irradiation on May 9, 1984. One of the founders of the Karen Silkwood Fund, she is also an attorney in the District of Columbia.

An Offer They Couldn't Refuse?

by Angus Mackenzie

An agreement between the Central Intelligence Agency and the American Civil Liberties Union has prompted Congress to shield CIA "operational files" from the release requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Reagan signed it into law Oct. 15, 1984.

Passage of the CIA Information Act is the first legislative victory in this administration's four-year effort to control embarrassing leaks and to limit the FOIA.

Democrats and civil libertarians, in an eyebrow-raising alliance, supported the measure that permits CIA boss William Casey to "designate" which of his "operational files" will be exempt from FOIA-mandated search and release. Congressional staffers voiced surprise at the strong bipartisan support for CIA boss Casey's bill, noting that Casey, who was Pres. Reagan's campaign manager in 1980 then spied on the Democrats.

Democratic support of the measure also appeared to conflict with the 1984 party platform regarding the FOIA, which says, "We will rescind Reagan Administration directives imposing undue burdens on citizens seeking information about their government through the FOIA."

Democrats and the ACLU said they support the law because it would cover up little significant information. But historians and intelligence-beat reporters said it will allow the CIA boss to put in "operational files" those documents he wishes to hide. Congressional sources said the proposed law depends on the good faith of the CIA for implementa-

A new law will allow the CIA boss to put in "operational files" documents he wishes to hide from release under FOIA.

tion because judicial review of agency's actions are limited.

Democrats put teeth in the FOIA in 1974 after intelligence-agency abuses came to light in Watergate. That law makes all federal agencies, including the CIA, search, review, and release data in response to requests by individuals.

Intelligence sources, methods, and national security information have long been exempted from release.

The 1984 law, drafted by the CIA, ad-

dressed the agency's complaint that it is required to review requested files even though the information in them ultimately was seldom released. This review of documents to be kept secret wastes CIA officers' time. And breaks down compartmentalization of agency records which threatens security, according to the CIA.

The new law exempts CIA "operational files" from that search and review process which has freed some useful information to reporters. One investigation that may be affected by the new law regards President Kennedy's assassination, according to *Reader's Digest* writer Henry Hurt. Mr. Hurt's concern was confirmed by a CIA document released to Senator Leahy and inspected by this reporter. It listed cases that "may be affected" by this measure, and those linked to the JFK assassination were included.

Opponents in Congress, led by Rep. Ted Weiss, (D-N.Y.), said if this bill had been law, the public would not have known about CIA abuses that have come to light in recent years, including the agency's long-term involvement in the National Student Association and information concerning the 1954 Guatemalan coup.

In 1979, then-CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci first submitted the

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"operational files" exemption to Congress, dropping the CIA's previous demand for a total FOIA exemption.

He called for exemptions from review for CIA information on counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, security liaison arrangements and checks on potential sources. These were the exemptions enacted this year.

Individuals may still request "operational files" on themselves. Nonoperational files will still be searched, reviewed and be considered for release under the new law.

At first, the ACLU stopped Carlucci's proposal. The ACLU's legislative director told Congress in 1981: "What is the public to make of this when confronted with reports of a proposed Executive Order authorizing the CIA to carry out broad domestic security functions? Why should Congress accept this 'trust us' approach to CIA accountability?"

The Executive Order number 12333 authorizing CIA domestic activities was signed by President Reagan on Dec. 4, 1981. Nevertheless, in 1983, the ACLU began to change its stand. ACLU attorney Mark Lynch told then-CIA Deputy General Counsel Ernest Mayerfeld that the ACLU would "consider" the exemption, said both parties to this reporter. After that agreement, the CIA submitted its proposal to Congress.

The Deal

In exchange for ACLU support, the CIA agreed to speed its processing of FOIA requests, now delayed two-to-three years. And the agency promised not to reduce its FOIA labors for two years. Further, it would seek no total FOIA exclusion during this administration.

Morton Halperin, who had served Henry Kissinger on President Nixon's National Security Council, who now heads the ACLU National Security Project, helped ACLU lawyer Lynch negotiate the ACLU-CIA deal, according to ACLU sources. In September 1983, Halperin publicly denied cutting such a deal.

Senate approval came rapidly, on Nov. 17, 1983.

On May 10, 1984, in hearings before the House Government Operations Committee, ACLU attorney Lynch for the first time publicly endorsed the measure and encouraged its speedy adoption, and agreed with a CIA spokesman who said it would result in lit-



tle loss of information.

A retired CIA officer who had handled Directorate of Operations files said at that hearing the proposed law would hide "some 80 to 90 per cent of CIA files," and that "major investigations of the CIA by Congress have been triggered by media exposes bared by information released under FOIA."

Media objects

The press objected to the proposed law. It would "seal forever the information the public is most interested in," said the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. Those sentiments were echoed by The Newspaper Guild, Society of Professional Journalists and Radio-TV News Directors Association.

On May 11, 1984, *The New York Times* headlined its report of those May 10 hearings, "CIA and ACLU Support Curb on Information." This triggered a split within the ACLU over its support of the CIA measure.

ACLU Split

In the months that followed, ACLU Northern and Southern California affiliates voted to oppose the national ACLU's position.

On August 18, at a national ACLU meeting in New York, Meir Westreich of the Southern California ACLU said the proposed law was unconstitutional because it calls for the selective application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs lawsuits. The bill removes "virtually all discovery tools" in litigation to be filed under it. (Discovery

proceedings in lawsuits are akin to poker players showing cards before deciding who wins.)

Westreich told ACLU executives that by exempting the CIA from discovery, the proposed law plays into current conservative judicial efforts to curb discovery, to protect the government from lawsuits. In response to Westreich, the ACLU had two general counsels review its support; one approved and one opposed support, according to ACLU President Norman Dorsen.

Objections also came from other quarters. Jim Lesar, an attorney who represents President Kennedy assassination investigators said in a memo to Congress that the proposed law would hide CIA records examined by Presidential commissions and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and that the CIA has wanted since 1965 to hide its files on the Kennedy murder.

The bill was sent to the House Government Operations Information Subcommittee where it was amended to stop a recent Reagan-team effort to FOIA-exempt entire systems of records in many agencies by using a loophole in the Privacy Act. Subcommittee Chairman Glenn English's amendment was intended to strengthen individuals' rights to inspect CIA and other agencies' records on themselves.

On Sept. 10, English's committee reported the bill to the floor for a vote, and concluded, "Instead of reviewing records in operational files on a page-by-page, line-by-line basis, the CIA will be able to deny most requests for records in these files in a categorical fashion."

In dissenting from that committee report, Rep. Weiss said, "This bill grants a carte blanche exemption from the FOIA for the CIA, under the guise of procedural reform."

He said the bill would render "meaningless" the courts' ability to compel the release of CIA documents.

When the bill came up for House debate on Sept. 17, Intelligence Committee Chairman Edward P. Boland, (D-Mass), said, "The issue that convinced the ACLU leadership to endorse H.R. 5164 was its judicial review provisions."

In opposition, Rep. John Conyers, Jr., (D-Mich.), agreed that little CIA operational data had been FOIA released, but said, "the scarcity of information only makes that information more valuable."

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As voting began Sept. 19, Weiss leafletted his colleagues, streaming onto the House floor, imploring each, "Keep the CIA honest. Vote no."

Representatives whipped their plastic cards from their wallets into the electronic-voting devices. The CIA won 369-36. Outside the House gallery, CIA official Mayerfeld, who cut the deal with the ACLU, laughed delightedly and received congratulations.

Because California ACLU affiliates opposed the CIA measure, the following California representatives voted against the CIA Information Act: Boxer, Burton, Dellums, Dixon, Dymally, Edwards, Hawking, Stark and Torres. ■

The author testified against this legislation before the House Government Operations Information subcommittee on behalf of the Newspaper Guild.

Thumbscrews For Human Rights

The Reagan Administration has raised torturers from the dungeon chamber to the open market. The June 15, 1984 commodity control list indicates that one may apply for a license to export "specially designed implements of torture."

According to the Commerce Department, torture implements were added to the commodity controls list under the Administration's "human rights controls program." Prior to the listing, manufacturers of torture implements could export them without the knowledge or control of the government.

However, the obviously correct solution to this situation was to simply ban the manufacture and export of torture implements.

Under the hubris of human rights, there is a second serious deficiency. A validated license is not required for exporting implements of torture to Australia, Japan, New Zealand or members of NATO. Why? Because these

countries are not violators of internationally recognized human rights.

The glaring exception to this is NATO member Turkey. According to the Americas Watch Committee, the Helsinki Watch Committee, and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights: "The military junta in Turkey, since the 1980 coup which brought it to power, has egregiously violated the human rights of its citizens." Including "the arrests and torture of many thousands of Turkish citizens..."

Moreover, why would any country want to import implements of torture? What application do they have other than the violation of human rights?

The Commerce Department claims that no licenses have been granted for the export of torture implements. But, the Commerce Department would not know if torture implements had been shipped to Europe on their way to South Africa—where the Commerce Department recently okayed the shipment of shock batons to South Africa's police. ■

5999B Saps; specially designed implements of torture; straight jackets; police helmets and shields; and parts and accessories, n.e.s.

Controls for ECCN 5999B

Unit: Report in "\$ value."

Validated License Required: Country Groups QS-TVWYZ. A validated license is not required for export of these commodities to Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and members of NATO.

GLV \$ Value Limit: \$0 for all other destinations.

Processing Code: CM.

Reason for Control: Crime control (foreign policy).

As this item from the June 1984 commodity control list shows, the Reagan administration has made it legal to export torture instruments — supposedly to improve the government's ability to further human rights.

Canada's New Spies

by George Martin Manz

For decades, successive royal commissions in Canada investigating security matters have recommended the establishment of a civilian security agency. It wasn't until June that the recommendation was passed into legislation.

When the 1969 MacKenzie Royal Commission on security suggested the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security and Intelligence Branch be divorced from the RCMP—and run as a civilian security agency, the RCMP strenuously lobbied against it. Realizing it was outflanked, the government compromised. Canada's spies got a more separate structure, a civilian director general, and a new name — the Security Service (SS). A small but growing number of civilians entered the SS. The process of "civilianization" had begun.

The 1981 McDonald Royal Commission, however, revealed widespread lawbreaking by members of the SS. It, too, suggested the establishment of a civilian security service separate from the RCMP.

Following the publication of the McDonald Commission's report, the federal government decided to act on the recommendation and put the process in motion. Security and Intelligence Transitional Group (STIG) was formed in August 1981 to prepare position and discussion papers which led to the preparation and drafting of Bill C-157 — the bill to establish a civilian security agency. But the bill was soundly condemned by almost all sectors of the Canadian population and eventually it was withdrawn.

Bill C-9, a slightly altered version of Bill C-157, establishing the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS — pronounced Ceesis) was passed by the House of Commons on June 21. It was opposed by groups ranging from the Vancouver Coalition Against CSIS, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and most churches, to the provincial Attorneys General, the Canadian Bar Association and the Canadian

NEWS NOT IN THE NEWS

Medical Association. In order to pass Bill C-9 before the summer recess, the Liberal government invoked closure, cut off debate in both the House of Commons and the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee and opposed opposition amendments. The long and acrimonious debate on the bill raged for days in the House. Shortly after 5 a.m., the morning of June 21, it was all over. The bill was passed.

Bill C-9, a 47-page document containing 96 clauses, will fundamentally affect the rights and liberties of generations of Canadians. It constitutes the most dangerous attack on Canadian civil liberties since the infamous War Measures Act was invoked in the fall of 1970. A few of the main "highlights" from the bill will illustrate why.

Shutting the door on civil liberties

Clause 2 defines "threats to the security of Canada" in a very vague manner. 2(b) defines it as "foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person." This definition can be interpreted in various ways and therefore allows CSIS to make its own mandate. For example, Canadians who seek to halt trade between a repressive foreign government that has trading relations with Canada (such as El Salvador or the Philippines) could be in-

vestigated because the suspension of trade could be interpreted as being "detrimental" to Canada's interests. Activists planning a demonstration against a foreign official could be investigated if they have a private meeting to plan the demonstration. That could be defined as "clandestine."

Canadians need not be afraid of the new spy agency breaking the law as the Mounties did in the 1970s. Many of those crimes will now be legal.

In 2(c), raising funds for South African or Guatemalan rebels would be illegal because these funds support "acts of serious violence. . . for the purpose of achieving a political objective within Canada or a foreign state."

In 2(d), a group secretly planning to occupy a government office in order to get media coverage for their grievances could be investigated because they committed trespass, "a covert unlawful act," which could undermine "the constitutionally established government in Canada."

Warren Allmand (former Liberal

Solicitor General) proposed amendments to clause 2 which would have given it a more narrow and precise definition. Allmand was replaced on the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs because the government realized he would vote with the opposition.


Clause 13(3) allows CSIS to enter into arrangements with foreign governments and intelligence agencies and to provide them "with security assessments." This has been secretly going on for decades. It will now be legal for CSIS to share files and information with foreign intelligence agencies such as the CIA. Like the SS, CSIS will primarily be a domestic spy agency but will retain liaison officers abroad.

Clause 16 allows CSIS to help the Department of National Defense, the Canadian Security Establishment and the Department of External Affairs to spy on "any foreign state or group of foreign states" or any person other than a Canadian citizen, legal resident or Canadian corporation. In the future, Bill C-9 leaves open the possibility to expand the CSIS mandate or begin a new intelligence agency which will dramatically increase the collection of foreign intelligence.

Clause 18 makes it illegal to reveal information which identifies informants or "employees engaged in covert operational activities." This clause is aimed at stopping leaks such as former SS agent Robert Samson who revealed SS wrongdoings during the 1970s. Anyone who discloses information can be imprisoned for up to five years. Few, if any, employees will reveal dirty tricks because of fear of imprisonment.

Section 21(3) is particularly frightening. It allows CSIS to obtain judicial warrants to gain access to all files and records such as tax returns, all lawyer, medical, banking and personal records, to wiretap telephones and bug rooms, to open mail, and "to enter any place." Warrants may be issued for up to one year and are renewable. Warrants will not be difficult to obtain. In 1982, of 1,170 requests for wiretaps, *not one was refused*. According to MP Vic Althouse, "On a per capita basis, there are 20 wiretaps in Canada for every one in the United States."

CSIS will not have to obtain a warrant to plant informants in targeted organizations that they wish to spy on. Paid informants will often exaggerate or



NEWS NOT IN THE NEWS

No Comment

SANDRA CURRY: Wife, mother, businesswoman, Certified Pistol Shot, and Home Firearms Responsibility Instructor. Member of the National Rifle Association.

"My husband and I hunt almost every weekend during the season. It brings us closer together because we both share a love for the outdoors. Being a member of the NRA is like belonging to a large family. We are people who share common interests like environmental conservation and wildlife preservation. Some of the people I know can't believe I'm involved in the shooting sports. They all say, 'You don't look like the type.' I don't know what the 'type' looks like, but I'm a lady at the office and on the range. When I shoot, I'm always concerned with safety and I have my NRA training to thank for that. The NRA Education and Training Division provides valuable information that does not provide any other organization that does so much to promote firearms safety."

I'm the NRA.




The NRA emphasizes firearms safety in all of the courses they sponsor - from the beginning fundamentals and "Home Firearms Responsibility" to the more advanced coach certification course. If you would like to join the NRA and want more information about our programs, write to: National Rifle Association, 1701 N. 17th St., Washington, D.C. 20012. For the full text of the National Rifle Association's policy.

JOHN RIGGINS: Husband, Father, Professional Football Player, selected Most Valuable Player in Super Bowl XVII and Life Member of the National Rifle Association.

"I grew up in northeast Kansas, about 300 yards from the edge of town. My father would get us early to go hunting. We hunted pheasant, quail, rabbit and some duck. But being outdoors was something I liked before I even knew what a gun was. Gun safety is number one with me. I've taught my oldest son, Bobby, that shooting requires responsibility and respect. We hunt together every chance we get and now my wife has expressed an interest in learning to shoot. I'm a Life Member of the NRA. It helps educate people, protects my guns and stands for the same things I do. My life is hectic now, but when things slow down a little, I plan to get more involved in the NRA."

I'm the NRA.



The NRA's Hunter Services Division helps about millions of Americans with the principles of good sportsmanship and hunting safety procedures necessary for responsible wildlife management. If you would like to join the NRA and want more information about our programs, write to: National Rifle Association, 1701 N. 17th St., Washington, D.C. 20012. For the full text of the National Rifle Association's policy.

The National Rifle Association is trying to boost the acceptance of guns with glossy ads in widely read magazines like Newsweek featuring the "housewife and businesswoman" at right and John Riggins of the Washington Redskins.

distort information in order to seem worthy of payment. Because informants are often not trustworthy, more than one is sometimes sent to obtain more accurate information. Informants can also become agent provocateurs such as Andy Moxley who planned to occupy the Parliament Hill Peace Tower and then informed on the participants.

A toothless paper tiger

The "review" process consists of two parts: an Inspector General appointed to monitor and review the operational policies and activities of CSIS and the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) consisting of between three and five members of the Privy Council who are not members of either the House of Commons or the Senate. Both the Inspector General and SIRC must swear secrecy oaths and have access to all information *except cabinet discussions*.

Bill C-9's "review" process rejected the McDonald Commission recommendation for an all-party parliamentary review committee with the right to see all documents and evidence including cabinet documents. Parliamentary accountability will be non-existent. The

U.S. and West Germany have elected all-party intelligence review committees. Why not Canada? Obviously, the government does not trust elected officials.

Because of its oath of secrecy, SIRC can't blow the whistle on illegal CSIS ac-

A new Canadian law, which sets up a civilian security agency, will fundamentally affect the rights and liberties of generations of Canadians.

tivities to either parliament or the media. It has been revealed that the SS withheld information regarding the surveillance of former NFU President Roy Atkinson from then-Solicitor General Warren Allmand. How can we be assured that CSIS will not withhold information from SIRC? No wonder Allan Lawrence, former Solicitor General in the Joe Clark government referred to SIRC as a "toothless paper tiger."

A new era of spying began on July 16 when CSIS took over the cloak and dagger business from the SS. Still, the "civilian" dimension of the service remains illusory as approximately 90 percent of the RCMP spies joined the new service.

CSIS has far-reaching powers which do not adequately safeguard the democratic rights and freedoms of Canadians. Canadians need not be afraid of the CSIS breaking the law in the same manner as the SS did in the 1970s. Many of their former crimes will now be legal. The CSIS has far greater powers than the SS ever had while Canadians now have fewer safeguards to protect them.

The fact that the new security agency's "drag net" is so fine indicates the primary purpose of the "civilian" service may not be to catch alleged spies and terrorists at all. With the prospect of the domestic depression deepening and international Cold War tensions escalating, the security service's principal goal may be to stifle all dissent and radical protest in this country.

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NEWS NOT IN THE NEWS

U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Pied Piper to Armageddon

by Arjun Makhijani

Immediately after World War II and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff began a wide-ranging reformulation of U.S. military strategy to incorporate nuclear weapons in a central role. Top Secret and Secret documents of the Joint Chiefs, now declassified, reveal that they considered the gamut of nuclear weapons uses: from "strike first" against the Soviet Union, to nuclear threats against "vulnerable nations," to terrorizing civilian populations by arousing "primordial fears" about the unknown effects of radiation which people could not see or smell or touch.

The Joint Chiefs sought to establish:

- coordination between "intelligence," conventional forces and nuclear weapons;
- nuclear strategy for the period of U.S. nuclear monopoly;
- contingency planning and strategy in the event that some adversary acquired nuclear weapons.

Terror of the power of atomic bombs and fears of radiation were to be enlisted in a U.S. military strategy designed to "break the will of nations and of peoples":

"In the face of. . . the bomb's demonstrated power to deliver death to tens of thousands, of primary military concern will be the bomb's potentiality to break the will of nations and of peoples by the stimulation of man's primordial fears, those of the unknown, the invisible, the mysterious. We may deduce from a wide variety of established facts that the effective exploitation of the bomb's psychological implications will take precedence over the application of the destructive and lethal effects in deciding the issue of war."

The use of nuclear threats and actual nuclear bombings were therefore to be integrated with conventional forces into a strategy of forcing "vulnerable nations" into submission:

"The over-all strategy of major warfare will be profoundly affected by

the advent of the atomic bomb and developments in the field of scientific warfare. It is conceivable that vulnerable nations might be forced to capitulate by the threat of having their powers of resistance quickly reduced by use of the atomic bomb. Nevertheless, conventional forms of warfare almost certainly will be required in addition. . . thus, advanced bases and areas must be secured for the more effective projection of our own offensive operations and to deny advantageous areas to the enemy. Such operations will require amphibious and airborne forces with naval and air support and conventional ground forces to occupy and defend the seized areas. We must have available the forces required to carry out these essential operations."

Now declassified documents from the Joint Chiefs of Staffs reveal that foreign military bases were meant to draw nuclear fire away from the U.S.

This policy of threatening non-nuclear countries with nuclear weapons continues to this day. It has been carried even further with the addition of neutron bombs to the U.S. arsenal—bombs which are designed to maximize killing and radiation effects while limiting property damage (see *Counterspy*, Vol. 6, no. 4).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff realized, of course, that the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons could not continue indefinitely. Even during World War II, when the Soviet Union was an ally of the U.S. and bore the brunt of the fighting and casualties to defeat Nazi forces, General Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project which built the atom bomb believed that "Russia was the enemy and the project was conducted on that basis." Nuclear

war against the Soviet Union has therefore always been a principal aspect of U.S. military strategy. For this the Joint Chiefs prepared a strategy of "offensive-defense which could be waged against any power, nuclear or non-nuclear."

The first element in this strategy was "intelligence," officially, to prevent a surprise attack on the U.S. Nothing was to be spared in the effort to create a "thoroughly adequate intelligence system."

As a second facet of the "offensive-defense" strategy, the Joint Chiefs sought to expand the definition of an "attack" upon the U.S. to include any military *preparations* which could then be interpreted as indications of a potential attack upon the U.S.:

"If an enemy prepared an attack, overwhelm him and destroy his will and ability to make war before he can inflict significant damage upon us."

Third, the acquisition of military bases in foreign countries was central to the strategy of "offensive-defense":

"Offensively, it is essential to transport the bomb to the internal vital areas of the enemy nation. The closer our bases are to these areas the more effectively can this be done with a greater chance of success. Defensively, the farther away from our vital areas we can hold our enemy through our possession of advance bases, the greater our security. Furthermore, if our enemy is forced to penetrate a defensive base system in depth, the greater are our chances of adequate warning, interception and destruction of the attacking force. All of this points to the great importance of expanding our strategic frontiers in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and to the shores of the Arctic."

Five years after that statement, after the U.S. had acquired bases across the world from West Germany to the Philippines, a Joint Chief of Staff document declared that their acquisition of these bases "had been dictated largely by atomic weapons considerations."

NEWS NOT IN THE NEWS

U.S. government propaganda after World War II proclaimed that the U.S. would protect its allies with a "nuclear umbrella." This was supposed to mean that the U.S. would treat any attack upon its allies as an attack upon itself. While the policy was literally true, the implication that the policy was meant to protect the allies from nuclear attack was false. Not only that, the documents indicate that the "nuclear umbrella" might have been a deliberate deception.

According to the Joint Chiefs' document, the foreign bases were meant to draw any adversary's nuclear fire away from the U.S.—at least in the initial period of the war and perhaps throughout the war. An implicit but clear corollary of this strategy was that destruction on the U.S. "homeland" was to be minimized by increasing the likelihood of destruction in the countries where the U.S. bases and anchorage areas were located. Far from protecting its allies, the "nuclear umbrella" was thus designed to make them the targets of weapons which would fall onto their territories *instead of the U.S.*

This cynical policy was the result of the close study by the U.S. military of the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

"We can form no adequate mental picture of the multiple disaster which would befall a modern city, blasted by one or more atomic bombs and enveloped by radioactive mists. Of the survivors in the contaminated areas, some would be doomed by radiation sickness in hours, some in days, some in years. But, these areas, irregular in size and shape, as wind and topography might form them, would have no visible boundaries. No survivor could be certain he was not among the doomed and so, added to every terror of the moment, thousands would be stricken with a fear of death and the uncertainty of the time of its arrival."

Thus the same reasoning which led the Joint Chiefs to believe that other nations could be terrorized into submission by nuclear threats gave rise to a basing policy which was to minimize the bombing of U.S. cities at the expense of its allies.

While some aspects of the U.S. strategy have changed with the introduction of intercontinental missiles, its spirit as well as many of its essential details remain in place. *Counterspy* has documented and extensively analyzed the

recent reformulation of U.S. first strike policy and the country's renewed quest for nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union (*Counterspy*, Vol. 6, no. 4; Vol. 7, nos. 1 and 2). It is important to note that the basing of first-strike Pershing II missiles in West Germany and the creation of a first-strike submarine missile force (including the Trident II and D-5 missiles) are fully consistent with the policy of using U.S. bases as launching points for a surprise attack on the Soviet Union. The U.S. first strike weaponry fits in well with the following declared U.S. plans to "prevail" in an all-out nuclear war:

- the use of Pershing II's as a "decapitation" force to eliminate Soviet command centers (and many cities);
- the nearly simultaneous elimination of most Soviet landbased missiles using MX and some Trident II, D-5 missiles;
- the use of forward-based naval forces in the Northeastern Pacific and in the Baltic to eliminate much of the Soviet navy in or close to port.

Since the Soviet Union would still have considerable nuclear forces left, a policy of basing other parts of the nuclear war arsenal such as cruise missiles abroad, as well as very dispersed naval anchorage areas and command and intelligence centers, would force the Soviet Union to direct much or most of the remaining weapons to these U.S. foreign bases to try and reduce the scope of follow-up at-



tacks on the Soviet Union.

It is in this context that the Pentagon apparently seeks to prevent most of the few remaining Soviet missiles from reaching the U.S. by using space-based weapons. Since these "Star Wars" weapons would not be able to prevent a substantial proportion of incoming missiles from breaking through, their installation is inconsistent with a defensive strategy: a point that the most ardent nuclear warriors must admit.

The Soviet leadership is, to be sure, aware of these possibilities. The Soviet Union has often said it would go into a "launch-on-warning" posture if threatened with a first strike. It has begun to deploy long range cruise missiles and will likely develop countermeasures to the "Star Wars" weapons.

The U.S. government's nuclear strategy rose from a cynical policy of making other people targets in an age of overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority and very few nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. The U.S. nuclear strategy has become a suicidal gamble with the lives of the people of the United States. Recently, predictions have emerged that use of nuclear weapons will plunge the world into a "nuclear winter," even should a nuclear war employ far fewer weapons than the Pentagon plans to use in its "protracted nuclear war" and irrespective of the number of bombs that might fall on any particular country. ■

DESTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT:

APARTHEID'S "TARGET U.S." CAMPAIGN

While U.S. protestors have targeted South Africa's racist system of "apartheid," South Africa has conducted a secret campaign to buy itself a better image — through illegal campaign contributions, front organizations, jaunts to South Africa for U.S. Congress members, and by buying U.S. newspapers.



BY MURRAY WAAS

S ometime in the spring of 1976, four men attended a secret meeting in Pretoria, the capitol of South Africa. The four men were longtime intimates, the most powerful men in South Africa. They included then South African Prime Minister John Vorster; Minister of Finance Owen Horwood; and the Minister of Information and Interior Connie Mulder, then thought to be Vorster's "heir apparent," the man most likely to succeed him as Prime Minister.

To an outsider, the fourth man attending the meeting would appear strangely out of place. He did not learn about politics in the Afrikaaner meeting halls of Pretoria and the Transvaal. But rather in the backrooms of Brooklyn as a one-time aide to the late Tammany Hall boss Carmine Desapio. During the spring 1976 meeting in Pretoria, this fifth man, Sydney Baron, was the South African government's public relations representative and political advisor in the United States. Among the services Barn provided the South African government was advising them on the fine art of buying political influence in the United States.

During the spring 1976 meeting between Baron and the most senior officials



of the South African government, the main topic of discussion was then-Senator John Tunney (D-Cal.), considered by the South Africans to be one of their most formidable adversaries on Capitol Hill.

Baron told the South Africans that if they inflated his personal salary by

\$200,000 over the following year, he would see to it that the money would be secretly funnelled into the campaign of Tunney's opponent, Republican S.I. Hayakawa. If his Congressional influence-buying plans were unsuccessful and Tunney was reelected, Baron said, the South African government should



The ugly realities of apartheid (opposite, top) have roused protest from its black victims (left) and Americans. The U.S. anti-apartheid movement has been re-ignited in recent months, with protesters picketing the South African embassy in Washington, D.C. every day (above).



not renew the contract with his public relations firm for the following year.

The South African officials agreed to provide Baron with the extra \$200,000. A short time later, S.E. Hayakawa won a close Senate race against then-incumbent John Tunney. And Baron's contract with South African was renewed.

Two years later, Baron attended another meeting in South Africa with Vorster, Horwood and Mulder. On that occasion they discussed the political future of Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), whom one South Africa official told me was "our number one enemy in your country."

During that second meeting Baron laid out another proposal: if the South Africans inflated his salary by \$250,000, the money would be secretly channelled into the campaign of Clark's opponent, Republican Rodger Jepsen. The South African officials approved Baron's proposal. And, he was provided with the additional quarter of a million dollars.

In November 1978, Rodger Jepsen defeated Dick Clark in a close race.

These plans by the South African government to covertly provide \$450,000 in campaign contributions to defeat former Senators Tunney and Clark—reported previously by this journalist—have now been further confirmed in a series of on-the-record interviews with a former South African Secretary of Information, Eschel Rhoodie.

According to Rhoodie, Baron never told him how the \$450,000 had been actually funnelled into the two U.S. Senate

campaigns. Says Rhoodie:

"... After the first time [providing the \$200,000 to Baron in 1978 to help elect Senator Hayakawa (R-Cal.)], I did ask him specifically [how he funnelled the money into Hayakawa's campaign] because I knew the United States better than anybody else inside South Africa, and couldn't believe that this could happen. . . But you know Baron was the sort of guy who would say, "Look, I told you that if this guy [did not win] his election, I would not be sitting [here] talking to you today. You would have fired me. That was the deal. Wasn't it? So trust me."

So I said, "Yes, but I am curious as to how you managed to do it. That's a lot of money."

So he said, "I've used various channels." He said, "I know how to do these things."

In Rhoodie's opinion, the late New York public relations man was not true to his word. Says Rhoodie, "I am afraid that my opinion is that Sydney Baron just put that money in his pocket."

Rhodie has no hard evidence to back up his belief, however. He says that he simply does not know what happened to the \$450,000 once it was passed to Baron from the South African government.

Some evidence suggests, however, that the \$450,000 in South African funds was indeed funnelled into the two U.S. Senate campaigns.

According to another South African official, Rhoodie—who was opposed to the Congressional influence buying plans—was purposely kept in the dark by other South African officials about the mechanics of the Congressional influence-buying campaign because of his outspoken opposition to them.

As Rhoodie himself partly explains:

I said. . . I said, you know I am opposed to this sort of thing. I said I am doing this because it is an order of the Prime Minister. I said if it had not been for the orders of the Prime Minister, I would not have done this because I think it is wrong. I was dead set against that right from the beginning. You know it is one thing to influence public opinion, and buying into the *Washington Star* would influence public opinion, but it is another thing to be directly involved in the electoral process of another country. You see. . . that sort of thing I consider to be a direct intervention into the election process and I am against that.

Another former official confirms this view: "Eschel [Rhoodie] was opposed to this whole business right from the start. He was quite outspoken [about that]. For that reason, I think Baron and the others [Vorster, Horwood] purposely kept him in the dark as the plan progressed." This official went on to say that "there's absolutely no way that John Vorster and Owen Horwood would have given Baron that kind of money [\$450,000] and not know exactly what was done with it. A man like Vorster does not like to trust anyone. . . he's quite cynical, someone who understands ruthlessness and power. . . If he approved the transfer of such funds, he would have known what happened to every penny."

It was not uncommon, according to Rhoodie and others, for former Prime Minister Vorster to meet with Baron privately, without Rhoodie or others present. Baron also met privately with other senior South African officials. And on at least one occasion, Andrew Hatcher—one of Baron's top aides and previously one of the most senior black officials in the Kennedy Administration—also met privately with John Vorster. Thus, John Vorster could have been kept fully advised as to what was happening to his secret funds, while



To polish its image abroad, South Africa brought U.S. Congress members to South Africa. Such trips, lampooned in this cartoon from the Rand Daily Mail, are illegal under U.S. law.

keeping Rhoodie in the dark.

Another small part of the puzzle might be provided by a onetime associate of Baron's. The Baron associate remembers having lunch with Baron and another of his top aides, L.E.S. Devilliers, at an expensive New York hotel in the late 1970's.

Devilliers was no ordinary employee of the Baron firm. Previously, he had been Rhoodie's top deputy and right hand man at the South African Department of Information, the only other individual at the Department who knew all the details of the South African government's influence buying activities.

Devilliers was well qualified when he applied to work at Baron's firm, being at one time one of the top propagandists in the South African government. It is unknown, however, if there was another factor Baron considered when Devilliers approached him about possible employment. Devilliers was one of only a handful of South African officials who knew about the funnelling of \$450,000 in South African government funds to Baron to illegally influence the two U.S. Senate campaigns.

At the lunch he attended with Devilliers and Baron, remembers the Baron associate, the firm's connections on Capitol Hill inadvertently came up in conversation. The name of Rodger Jepsen was eventually mentioned.

"He owes us," the Baron associate remembers Devilliers saying. "We stole that [his election against former Senator Dick Clark] for him. That was ours."

At that point, Baron became stonefaced and asked to speak to Devilliers alone. When the two men returned to the table, Baron told his associate, "Discretion is required in our line of work. You understand that."

The Clark-Jepsen election was never brought up again, least of all by Baron's younger associate. "I did not think it would be helpful in furthering my career there," he wryly told me.

There is additional evidence that Baron passed along the \$450,000 to Jepsen's and Hayakawa's campaign.

In 1978, after reports surfaced in the South African press alleging financial irregularities in the Department of Information, a South African government committee, called "the Kemp Committee," was set up to evaluate the Department's projects and decide if they were effective enough to be continued.

One project evaluated by the Commission was the Department of Information's hiring of the Sydney Baron Company as its public relations representative in the U.S. Both Sydney Baron and L.E.S. Devilliers gave informal testimony before the Commission arguing that it would be in the best interest of the South African government to continue retaining the firm. With tape recorders running, both Baron and Devilliers boasted to Commission officials about their roles in secretly funnelling \$450,000 of South African funds into the campaign coffers of Senators Hayakawa and Jepsen.

As the former head of the Department

of Information, Eschel Rhoodie was allowed to attend those sessions, he recalls:

They [Baron and Devilliers] in front of Brigadier Kemp and two other officials of the Bureau of State Security, [who were] then evaluating these projects, said that is what happened [the money was passed on].

After Baron and Devilliers testified about their role in passing along the illegal campaign contributions, the South African government renewed Baron's contract for another year. Continued Rhoodie:

They [the Kemp Committee] evaluated this and then sent [a] report up to the South African Security Council. The Security

tative in the United States.

As a one-time aide to the late Tammany hall boss, Carmine Desapio, Baron had a front row seat to one of the most corrupt political machines in this country.

In 1961, Baron's name surfaced in a report prepared by the New York State Commission of Investigation, which was looking into corrupt practices surrounding the awarding of New York municipal contracts to electrical firms. The Commission charged that New York City's water commissioner at the time had attended a meeting in Baron's office where representatives of a Chicago electrical fixture firm were told that city contracts could be obtained if the firm hired Baron. The Chicago firm declin-

When Baron became South Africa's public relations representative in the U.S., he did not leave the lessons he learned from Tammany Hall behind. Besides secretly funnelling the \$450,000 into U.S. Senate campaigns, he also provided a number of other questionable services for his South African friends.

Even the Vatican was not beyond the reach of Baron's activities. According to a former Baron associate, South African officials asked Baron to set up meetings between them and high level Vatican officials as part of a clamp down on anti-apartheid, South African Catholic priests operating in South Africa.

The man who arranged contacts with Vatican officials was Thomas Deegan, a New York public relations man who was one of the Vatican's most decorated laymen in the United States. Some of Deegan's activities are described in an August 17, 1976 memorandum sent from Deegan to Baron. Wrote Deegan:

My mission to both London and Brussels relative to the Anglican church and the Vatican was successful. In both areas, the ground work is being laid at high levels before bringing together at the summit level counterpart churchmen of the Dutch reformed church, the Vatican and the Anglican church, separately. . .

There were three other highly-placed clerics whom Deegan felt must be approached—all with a view to setting up a meeting between the Vatican Secretary of State and leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church.

As I told you in our long distance telephone conversation the day after my return, I think it is indicated that I will have to go back to both of these bases before long and, from a political standpoint, in a visit with the principals in South Africa.

When shown a copy of the memorandum, Rhoodie confirmed that Deegan and Baron set up a meeting at the Vatican for him in 1976 with Cardinal Casaroli, the Vatican Secretary of State. Later the same year when Casaroli was ill, Deegan and Baron set up another meeting for Rhoodie with Cardinal Giovanni Benelli, the Archbishop of Florence and then Acting Vatican Secretary of State.



Eschel Rhoodie (left) was the chief engineer of South Africa's secret propaganda campaign under former Prime Minister John Vorster (right).

Council was then chaired by the present Prime Minister and by [the rest of the ministers, including the ministers of defense, justice, and foreign affairs]. They approved Baron's contract again for the next year and I know [that] for a fact, because it was tape recorded.

There is no doubt that Sydney Baron was capable of making illegal campaign contributions on behalf of the South African government. An examination of his career shows that he and his firm have been involved in questionable activities before, during, and after he was South Africa's public represen-

ed the offer. A competitor accepted the offer and subsequently obtained a New York City municipal contract. The Commission also alleged that Baron's Scarsdale home was rewired at a very discounted price by another electrical firm on whose behalf he had helped obtain contracts with the City of New York.

Besides representing the South African government in the U.S., Baron has also done public relations work in this country for the repressive governments of Taiwan and the Dominican Republic. Among his responsibilities was white washing reports of human rights violations in those countries.

Baron died in 1979. The following year, his firm's contract with the South African government was terminated but that did not stop his firm from engaging in questionable activities.

After losing its South African contract, Baron's firm stepped up its business with two other foreign clients—Japan and Taiwan. One of the members of Congress the firm often lobbied was then-Representative Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.), Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

According to Justice Department records, representatives of the Sydney S. Baron Company arranged meeting between Wolff and members of Japan's Parliament, the Diet, in 1979 and 1980, and brought a Japanese electronic industry delegation to see Wolff and other Representatives in 1980. In 1979, Wolff also met with Baron representatives and their Taiwanese clients during a trip to the Island. That same year, according to the Justice Department files, Wolff met on October 23 and November 8 with a Baron official in Washington, D.C. to discuss the Taiwan Relations Act.

In November 1980, Wolff lost a bid for reelection. Within a couple of

months, the Congressman who had so often been successfully lobbied by Baron's firm, joined the company on January 5, 1981. According to Justice Department files, Wolff's new salary was to be \$50,000 a year.

Four months later, the Baron firm—with the staff supplemented by the former chairman of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs—signed a new \$350,000 per year contract to be Taiwan's official lobbyist in this country.

A Covert War

South Africa's campaign to influence U.S. policy did not begin—or end—with hiring the Sydney S. Baron Company. In fact, during the last decade, the Republic of South Africa has engaged in a massive covert war in the United States.

In the past, foreign nations have engaged in wars against the United States with soldiers and on battlefields. The prices of those wars have been great. But, in the end, the United States has come away with its political sovereignty and rights of self-determination for its citizens.

South Africa, however, has been able to accomplish what no other foreign nation has managed to do against the U.S.

in a conventional war. While not a single shot was fired and the American people never knew such a secret war was even being waged, the right to self-determination of millions of Americans may have been diminished. For if \$450,000 of South African funds were secretly funnelled into the 1976 California and 1978 Iowa Senate campaigns, then the South African government—and not the people of California and Iowa—may have determined who became U.S. Senators.

But the secret transfer of South African funds into the U.S. electoral process is only a small part of the South African government's covert war against the United States.

A two year investigation of that covert war and the South African government's influence buying activities in this country has been conducted by this reporter. More than a hundred individuals have been interviewed. Three former South African government officials have granted extensive interviews for this article. One of those officials, Eschel Rhodie, has agreed to talk on the record. The result is fourteen hours of taped interviews.

Also used in this investigation have been several hundred pages of internal State Department documents and cables. Some of those documents were released under the Freedom of Information Act. Others remain classified. Reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and quoted in this story are still classified. Justice Department Foreign Agents' Registration files cited in this story are a matter of public record.

Also reviewed were dozens of pages of internal records of the South African Department of Information and internal files of two South African front organizations, the Christian League of Southern Africa and the London-based Foreign Affairs Research Institute. Other sources of information were internal files of the Sydney Baron Company and the Panax Corporation, a newspaper firm secretly provided with South African funds in order to buy U.S. newspapers on South Africa's behalf.

Among the results of this lengthy investigation:

- Besides giving \$200,000 to Sydney Baron in an attempt to bring about former Senator S.I. Hayakawa's election in 1976, the South African government illegally funnelled a \$2,000 gift to the Senator. The payment was made in the form of an honorarium in July 1978 to

In Brussels, the meeting with the Papal Nuncio, who for years was the Chief of Protocol at the Vatican, was exceptionally gratifying.

THE DEEGAN GROUP, LTD.
342 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

MEMO TO: Sydney S. Baron
FROM: Thomas J. Deegan, Jr.
DATE: August 17, 1978
RE: South Africa

My mission to both London and Brussels relative to the Anglican Church and the Vatican was successful. In both areas the ground-work is being laid at high levels before bringing together at the summit level counterpart Churches of the South Reformed Church, the Vatican and the Anglican Church, separately.

I had enormous help in the Anglican Church from Dr. Derek Pritchard whom I previously have identified for you. In Brussels, the meeting with the Papal Nuncio Archbishop Cardinal, who for years was the Chief of Protocol at the Vatican, was exceptionally gratifying.

For the sake of this memorandum, let us call this Phase I. In the meeting with His Grace in London, he spoke knowledgeably of the situation in South Africa pointing out that as Chairman of Archbishop's Bureau for many years, he had much to do with Churches referred to above in my Paragraph 1, were highly desirable and would certainly begin to open a way for adjustments in South Africa. He said he felt that because of the rigidity of the present policy there, however, (founded in what the Government believes to be good faith) modifications are not likely. He suggested, for example, that there were numerous party restrictions which could appropriately be removed without any loss of face on the one hand and with considerable possibility of gains on the other. He felt this would be a viable possibility leading out of any discussion between the South Reformed Church and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Coggan.

This memo from prominent Catholic Thomas Deegan to South Africa's "public relations" consultant, Sidney Baron, reveals the Vatican connection to the apartheid regime.



As part of its propaganda campaign, South African officials cultivated political leaders such as Paraguayan dictator Stroessner (shown meeting with Rhoddie, left). At right, Connie Mulder, head of the propaganda ministry meets with then Governor of California Ronald Reagan.

Hayakawa from the South African Foreign Affairs Association, a fully-subsidized front organization for the South African government: it is illegal for a member of Congress to accept gifts or money from a foreign government or its agents. At the time that Hayakawa received the illegal \$2,000 payment, he was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its Subcommittee on Africa. Both regularly consider legislation regarding South Africa.

The South African government has since admitted publicly that it secretly subsidized the Foreign Affairs Association. Hayakawa has refused to return the \$2,000.

- In a blatant violation of established diplomatic tradition, a South African government official actively intervened in Iowa in 1978 to help get Rodger Jepsen elected to the Senate.

According to a State Department cable on the matter: "Over the weekend, the State Department was informed that. . . while in Iowa recently, a South African government official, Jan Van Rooyen, had publicly made some disparaging remarks about Senator Clark. . .

"Van Rooyen misrepresented Senator Clark's position on American investment in South Africa, alleging that Senator Clark had been urging disinvestment. Van Rooyen also volunteered the opinion that Iowans were getting the wrong opinion from 'Your Senator Clark.'" "In addition," said the cable, "Van Rooyen asked Iowans why their Senator

finds South Africa such a fine platform rather than dealing with the problems the state might face." Then Deputy Undersecretary of State David Newsom later sent a strongly worded diplomatic message to the South African government protesting its official's activities as an unwarranted involvement in the U.S. electoral process.

- Fifteen California newspapers—purchased by Michigan newspaper publisher John McGoff entirely with secretly provided South African funds—provided support for Senator S.I. Hayakawa in his 1976 Senate campaign.

- The South African government covertly financed more than fifty trips to South Africa for members of Congress and their aides despite the fact that since 1974 it has been illegal for a foreign government to provide such trips for U.S. officials.

To surreptitiously circumvent U.S. law, the South African government set up front organizations and utilized frontmen who ostensibly paid for trips. In fact, they were being covertly financed by the South African government.

Internal State Department files show that the department knew the South African government had set up the front organizations and was providing the fifty trips to members of Congress and their aides. Though aware that some of the organizations were South African fronts, the State Department did little to warn members of Congress of the information. In some cases, members of Con-


gress were warned by State Department officials during briefings before the trip that the trips were being subsidized by the South African government. But the State Department made no formal notes of the meetings, thus eliminating the possibility of prosecuting members of Congress who accepted illegal free trips. "Some of those conversations are best forgotten any way," one State Department official said in a cable when queried about his personal knowledge of such meetings by another Department official.

- The South African government provided free travel and secretly funneled campaign contributions to members of the House Agriculture Committee in an effort to have them vote higher sugar quotas for South Africa.

The South African Sugar Association, which has been secretly subsidized by the South African government, provided more than \$8,000 in free transportation and illegal campaign contributions to former Representative William Poague (D-Tex.), then Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, which was at the time considering adoption of higher sugar quotas for South Africa.

- Former President Gerald Ford was the recipient of \$20,000 in honaria from frontmen and front organizations of the South African government.

Ford accepted a \$10,000 honorarium from Senbank, a South African bank, for speaking at a U.S. conference supporting U.S. investment in South Africa. According to Eschel Rhoddie and other authoritative South African sources, the



Former U.S. President Gerald Ford received an award secretly financed by South Africa. Above, Ford meets with propaganda official Connie Mulder. Below, Rhoodie (left) and director of BOSS General Van den Bergh (second from right) meet with Israel's Prime Minister Rabin (second from left) and Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres (right).

South African government was the real source of Ford's payment. On another occasion Ford accepted a \$10,000 payment as the first lecturer to speak at the John McGoff Distinguished Lecture Series at Northern Michigan University. The lecture series was financed with secretly provided South African funds.

- The South African government paid bribes to senior officials of the AFL-CIO and the International Longshoremen's Union in exchange for their help in working against a trade boycott proposed by some union officials, according to a former South African official. The money was passed along to the union officials by Dutch unionists. Says the former official: "The Dutch union knew—I won't say that Dutch union, but

the Dutch individuals from that union knew and they informed [the] American participants where this came from and why."

Eschel Rhoodie refused to talk about the South African government's bribery of U.S. union officials. However, when presented with the former official's account, he did not deny any of the details of the bribery scheme as described by that official. An internal South African government memorandum, prepared by Eschel Rhoodie for the then-Minister of Information and the Interior, Connie Mulder, refers to the union bribery scheme:

The labor union attempt of 1972 to stop the handling of South African goods. With

a few exceptions this attempt failed worldwide. The key figure was George Meany in the USA. After appropriate contact he took a stand against the attempt and when the Americans did not go along the boycott failed. Two organizations in the USA and certain individuals had been in contact with Meany. Money changed hands.

- A number of senior officials in the Reagan administration have accepted money, favors, and free trips from the South African government.

In 1977, the South African government secretly provided some \$40,000 to Miami-based research institute, The Institute of Policy Studies, headed by Ret. Lt. General Daniel Graham, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The secret funds were provided, according to Eschel Rhoodie, for the Institute to produce an "independent study" espousing the strategic importance of South Africa to the west. Graham has served as advisor on defense policy for the Reagan administration.

Ernest LeFever, President Reagan's one-time nominee for the post of Undersecretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, accepted three all-expense paid trips to South Africa provided by the South African government and its front organizations. LeFever also helped secure the services of former Senator S.I. Hayakawa to appear at a conference sponsored by the South African Foreign Affairs Association, a South African front group, according to internal South African government files.

William Middendorf, the Reagan administration's Ambassador to the Organization of American States, served on the board of Directors of the Panax Corporation, at a time when that corporation was the recipient of \$11 million in laundered South African government funds to secretly buy the *Washington Star* and other U.S. newspapers on South Africa's behalf. Records of the Securities and Exchange Commission also show that Middendorf owned 5,000 shares of Panax stock at the time of the corporation's covert dealings with the South African government.

James Edwards, who once served as President Reagan's Secretary of Energy, accepted a free all-expense paid trip to South Africa provided by the South African Freedom Foundation, an entirely subsidized front organization for the South African government.

And Donald Dekeiffer, the one-time General Counsel to President Reagan's Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,

was once the South African government's chief paid lobbyist in Washington, D.C. In late 1982, as an official in the Reagan administration Dekeiffer travelled to South Africa to discuss with officials there the Reagan administration's relaxation of the U.S. trade embargo against South Africa. As South Africa's paid lobbyist in Washington, according to documents his firm filed with the Justice Department, Dekeiffer had lobbied U.S. officials to relax the U.S. trade embargo. Dekeiffer later helped implement that policy as General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative's Office in the Reagan Administration.

- The South African government provided more than two hundred U.S. journalists with free all-expense paid trips to South Africa. Among those included in the jaunts were some of the nation's most powerful and influential reporters, columnists, and newspaper and magazine editors. In almost all instances, the journalists returned to the U.S. to provide favorable news coverage of South Africa.

- The South African government secretly purchased a substantial secret interest in a chain of more than sixty newspapers in the U.S. to use as propaganda outlets in this country.

During 1974 and 1975, the South African government funnelled \$11.3 million to Michigan newspaperman John McGoff to secretly buy the *Washington Star* on South Africa's behalf. When McGoff's bid to buy the *Washington Star* failed, he used the \$11.3 million to set up a South African government front company, Global Communications, Inc. McGoff and Global then purchased (secretly on behalf of the South African government): the *Sacramento Union*; twenty smaller California newspapers; a 40 percent interest in Panax, Inc., a newspaper chain headed by McGoff which owned more than sixty newspapers around the country; and a 50 percent interest in the United Press International Television Network (UPITN).

- The South African government agreed to make five \$900,000-a-year payments totalling \$4.5 million to the overseas enterprises of Rev. Sun Myung Moon. In exchange, the church would give the South Africans a substantial secret interest in the church-owned *Washington Times*.

After the Unification Church received the infusion of South African funds, the *Washington Times* hired a number of individuals with close ties to the South African government. Serving on the

The South African government agreed to make payments totalling \$4.5 million to Rev. Sun Myung Moon. In exchange, the church would give the South Africans a substantial secret interest in the church-owned Washington Times.

Editorial Advisory Board of the *Washington Times* is John McGoff. The paper's editor and publisher is James Whelan, previously the vice President and editorial director of McGoff's Panax newspapers while South Africa secretly owned a substantial interest in the newspaper chain.

- The Chairman of the Curtis Publishing Company, Beurt SerVaas financially benefited from gifts and business deals engineered by him for the South African government. During the time the *Saturday Evening Post*—owned by Curtis Publishing and SerVaas—published more than a dozen pro-South African articles.

In 1976, SerVaas and his wife, Cort, the publisher and editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, visited South Africa as the all-expense paid guests of the South African government. Later, Beurt SerVaas was made a large stockholder of a South African newspaper, the *Citizen*, and a director of the South African news photo agency, Afripix. At the time, those two enterprises were secretly owned by the South African government, and SerVaas was awarded the stock and director positions though he contributed no financial investment or work to the two ventures.

In exchange for the South African government largesse, SerVaas allowed the *Saturday Evening Post* to become little more than a covert propaganda organ

for the South African government.

- Besides the activities of Sydney Baron discussed at the beginning of this article, a number of the South African government's paid American lobbyists and public relations specialists have engaged in questionable activities. An employee of Donald Dekeiffer, the former U.S. lobbyist for the South African government, for example, misrepresented herself to gain access to a restricted Congressional briefing on South Africa. And former Senator George Smathers (D-Fla.), who is now Pretoria's chief lobbyist in Washington, has engaged in a number of questionable activities, first as a member of Congress and then as a lobbyist.

Scandal Breaks Out

Just days before former South African Prime Minister John Vorster told even his closest colleagues that he was going to resign from office, he held a tightly-guarded, secret meeting with his most trusted cabinet ministers. Sitting to his left at the meeting was General Hendrik Van den Bergh, then the Head of Boss, the South African secret police and foreign intelligence service. Across the table from Van den Bergh sat Connie Mulder, then the Minister of Information and Interior.

Mulder was known among his colleagues as the "Crown Prince," the heir apparent to succeed Vorster as Prime Minister. Vorster had stayed on as Prime Minister longer than anyone had anticipated. But Connie Mulder had a good reason to be patient: few political observers in South Africa believed anyone other than Mulder had a chance to succeed Vorster as South Africa's next Prime Minister.

The topic of discussion during the two hour meeting was the so-called "Department of Information" scandal—the largest and most publicized political scandal in South Africa's history. The story of the scandal first began to unravel when the *Johannesburg Sunday Times* ran a story on its front page revealing that the Secretary of Information at the time, Eschel Rhoodie, and ten friends had taken a government-paid trip to the Indian Ocean island of the Seychelles. An internal government audit leaked to the *Sunday Express* described the trip as "extravagant" and alleged other financial irregularities within the Department of Information. South Africa's conservative

Afrikaans community was shocked that their government officials were wasting money.



A "confidential" May 1978 State Department cable sent from the American embassy in Capetown, South Africa to the Department in Washington correctly speculated that South Africa's political establishment would move quickly to stop further revelations about Rhoodie's activities and the Department of Information from surfacing. Said the cable in part:

Minister of Information Connie Mulder told Parliament the afternoon of May 3 that he was requesting the Public Service Commission to institute a study of the Department of Information with a view toward totally reorganizing it into an independent agency without cabinet status, similar to the U.S. or British Information Services. Mulder also announced a temporary reorganization of the Department, which will involve the 'retirement' of two top officials, Dennys Rhoodie [Eschel Rhoodie's brother] and Administration Officer Waldceck, both of whom have been named frequently in connection with the emerging scandals in the Department. Mulder indicated that the temporary reorganization would not affect Eschel Rhoodie, the Department's Secretary, whose name has also been closely linked with the scandal.

Comment: Mulder's announcement was clearly aimed at mitigating the effects of the spreading Department of Information scandals prior to the parliamentary debate on the subject scheduled for May 8. . . There is considerable surprise that Mulder opted not to dismiss Eschel Rhoodie, against whom there has been mounting evidence of unethical activities, if not corruption. Most parliamentary observers believed that this decision will haunt Mulder, and result in a continuation of demanding news stories about the Department.

The cable then added that, at least for the time being, details of the scandal were successfully being covered up.

"The *Sunday Express* has agreed for the moment, following a meeting with Connie Mulder, not to publish further revelations about the Department's activities, on the grounds that the information may be detrimental to national security. Attorneys for the *Express* are studying the possible implications. Meanwhile, press reports state that General Hendrik Van den Bergh, head of the Bureau of State Security (Boss) on May 2 discussed aspects of the scandal with Mulder and the Rhoodie brothers. Speculation among some journalists is that \$30 million in



Allegations of corruption in the propaganda ministry sparked a turbulent political scandal, from which P.W. Botha (top) emerged as Prime Minister. The Erasmus Commission chaired by Rudolph Erasmus (bottom) investigated the influence-buying operations.

Defense Ministry funds may have been secretly transferred to the Department of Information for use in influence buying and other overseas activities. This they say, would explain Van den Bergh's involvement and the national security aspects of the case which may be invoked by the South African government to prevent further revelations.

The intelligence information in the State Department was correct. There were undiscovered details of South Africa's influence buying activities overseas—and South African officials would do their best to suppress them.

One such official was Eschel Rhoodie, who sent a secret memorandum to Connie Mulder describing some of his Department's activities:

Information is involved in a propaganda war—it is in the first line of defense and is the Department which has to bear the brunt of the first attacks—attacks on South Africa in the press and on television. The government is aware of this

situation and realizes the need for energetic efforts to counter the attacks.

Later in the memorandum, Rhoodie described some of his department's energetic efforts:

The Department of Information controls, owns or is directly or indirectly involved in secret with:

- 5 church organizations in South Africa, the USA, Britain, and Germany
- 2 front organizations in the USA and Britain each with more than 30,000 members
- 3 news and photo agencies
- 2 film production companies abroad
- 12 regular publications in nine different countries including five in Africa
- 5 institutes abroad
- 14 front organizations in thirteen countries
- 3 book publishing companies
- 19 fulltime anonymous collaborators in eleven countries
- 3 public relations organizations in three countries
- The subsidization of 30 studies and books every year.
- The production of up to 13 motion pictures in eight countries.

During the cabinet meeting, Vorster read aloud from a confidential report prepared for him by Donald Dekeiffer, South Africa's lobbyist on Capitol Hill. Dekeiffer wrote that the U.S. Justice Department was winding up its investigation of the "Koreagate Scandal"—South Korea's efforts, with the help of Tongsun Park to bribe and buy influence with Congress. In the report Dekeiffer noted that the disclosures did more to strain U.S.—South Korean relations than could ever be repaired. If the full details of South Africa's U.S. influence-buying activities were ever known, Vorster told his cabinet officers, the results would be even more devastating.

Foremost in his mind were details of the \$450,000 in South African funds passed along to Sydney Baron to buy influence in two U.S. Senate campaigns. "I want every single document, every single scrap of paper on this subject destroyed," Vorster told his colleagues "If there is ever a leak on this subject, the security of our country will be at stake."

Sweatbeads had started to gather on Vorster's forehead. As he spoke, one observer noticed that his hands seemed to be shaking. It was unusual for anyone to see him ill at ease. For Vorster—a man who like Richard Nixon was at his toughest during crises—was a tough prosecutor and a one-time Minister of Justice with a reputation for ruthlessness.

Equally nervous was Connie Mulder.

As Minister of Information, he was one of the chief architects of the U.S. influence-buying activities. And Mulder was in close competition with Defense Minister Botha as to who would become South Africa's Prime Minister.


Mulder had good reason to be concerned. Forty eight hours before the National Party's caucus met to decide who would be the next Prime Minister of South Africa, word leaked out that the government commission looking into financial irregularities with the Department of Information was about to subpoena Mulder and question him about a secret Swiss bank account he maintained. The leak was devastating.

Explains Rhoodie: "Generally speaking, if you go into a group of politicians in South Africa and say, 'this judge on the Supreme Court told me that it was going to happen and you have my word of honor that is what he said to me,' everybody is going to believe you. And this is what they did. They believed that Connie Mulder was going to be hauled before the Commission to testify two days after he became Prime Minister and that would have been the biggest scandal in South African history. So they elected Botha because—not because they thought he was the best man, but because they were scared what would happen if Mulder were elected. It was fear that elected him."

By only a few votes in the Nationalist Party's caucus, Botha was elected Prime Minister of South Africa. After his inauguration, Botha directed two government commissions to investigate the alleged irregularities within the Department of Information.

In December, 1978, a report published by the second investigative commission, the Erasmus Commission, found that between 1974 and 1977, \$73 million in South African government funds were secretly funnelled into the Information Department to finance a "secret five year plan" aimed at "projecting a true image" of South Africa and "countering hostile attacks from abroad." "All in all," said the report, "the covertly provided funds had gone to finance secret propaganda and influence-buying projects abroad. Some fifty to sixty of them would remain secret and continue to be carried out."

The end result of the Erasmus Commission's report was that Botha's political rivals—Vorster, Mulder, Van den Bergh, and Eschel Rhoodie—would all be discredited and would retire from government. Rhoodie would later be extradited from France to stand trial on



This "confidential" State Department cable correctly speculated that the South African government would move quickly to suppress the budding "Information Department scandal." And, the cable reports, the Sunday Express agreed not to publish further revelations in the scandal to protect "national security."

charges of financial fraud in South Africa. Rhoodie would briefly be imprisoned—until a South African appeals court would unanimously reverse a conviction and six year prison sentence imposed by a lower court.

The Erasmus Commission made almost no mention of South African influence buying activities in the United States except to confirm an earlier report by the South African newspaper, the *Rand Daily Mail*, that the South African government had secretly funnelled \$11.5 million in secret payments to Michigan publisher John McGoff to buy the *Washington Star*. But for the most part, most of Rhoodie's secret activities in the United States would not be disclosed by the Commission and remained secret.

Inside A Secret Intelligence Agency

When Eschel Rhoodie became the South African Secretary of Information in 1974, South Africa was an outlaw nation in the international community. For that situation to change, South Africa's image in the world had to be improved—a task that seemed almost impossible.

In 1978, the Department of Information circulated a report among South African officials painting a bleak picture of the way the rest of the world viewed

their regime and its apartheid policies. Said the report:

South Africa was seen by the foreign media as a potential Vietnam, a new Lebanon, another hot spot in the world about to go up in flames. . . The government's credibility was described as very low. . . The continuation of the (secret) riots and the spread of the riots to other cities and to rural areas over a period of months had a devastating effect on South Africa's image as a politically stable country. . . In the United States, it was a very bad year for the country.

The South African newspaper, *The Citizen*, which was secretly owned by the Department of Information, also expressed to a degree the view of the world held by the Nationalist Party:

Moscow obviously does not want to colonize Southern Africa, but it does want to impose some form of Marxist control over the region in an essential part of its worldwide struggle for communist imperialism. . .

Theoretically, the U.S. onslaught on South Africa is conducted in the name of human rights. The more cynical however, believe that the U.S. faced with a rising resources crisis, wants to replace white democracies with black dictatorships so as to have no option but to do the west's bidding.

In fact, some South African officials tried to sell the South African people on the concept of "total onslaught"—a modern day version of the *laagar*, the encircling of Afrikaaner wagon trains in order to defend themselves from tribal attacks during their long treks northward away from their repressive British rulers.

"The concept of total onslaught" says Rhoodie, "was understood by certain politicians, notably by Mr. P.W. Botha [the current Prime Minister of South Africa] and General Magnus Malan who was then the Chief of the Armed Forces and [who] later became Minister of Defense." "This concept," says Rhoodie, "included the belief that there was an onslaught on the political, economic, and sporting field on South Africa and [that] this was worldwide and continuing. . . That is why they talk about total onslaught. The philosophy was that in order to counter such a total onslaught you needed a total reaction and in order to get a total reaction, all of the potential strong points of South Africa—all of its defensive mechanisms, whether it's political, economic, cultural, social, sporting—should be coordinated against this total onslaught and in order to do so you are required to [have] a government that is closer to a benevolent dictatorship than anything else."

It was against such a background that Eschel Rhoodie became South Africa's Secretary of Information.

When Rhoodie became Secretary of Information, the Department was only a propaganda ministry—and not a very good one at that. Its major activity was producing cultural and tourist films, the most memorable being "The Rock Art of the Bushmen."

But Eschel Rhoodie was a more ambitious, energetic man than his predecessors as Secretary of Information. He took very seriously the task given to him by John Vorster: to be the Prime Minister's chief engineer in a war against the "worldwide psychological and propaganda" campaign being waged against South Africa by the rest of the world.

Under Rhoodie, the Department of Information became more than a propaganda ministry. It also became a diplomatic service (engaging in secret diplomacy with Israel and Black African states) and an intelligence-agency. The Department also secretly owned publishing houses, film companies, news photo agencies, newspapers, and magazines around the world. Had it not been for the Department of Information scandal, Rhoodie and the Department might well have controlled one of the three or four largest publishing houses in the world.

Rhoodie also directed a covert program to secretly subsidize politicians in Africa and the rest of the world who were favorable to South Africa. At its height, the program would resemble that of the CIA. In fact, the South African government intervention in the U.S. electoral process by secretly funneling funds into two Senate campaigns appears, on the surface at least, to be not much different than U.S. attempts in the 1970's to undermine the democratically elected government of Chile.

One such recipient of secret Department of Information funds was James Menachem, who served as President of the Seychelles until June 1977, when he was deposed in a bloodless coup by Marxist Albert Rene. According to Rhoodie, Menachem was paid \$25,000 a year by the South African government in exchange for maintaining normal trade relations with South Africa, granting South African airlines landing rights on the islands, and providing intelligence information to the South Africans on the inner workings of the organization of African Unity (OAU), of which Menachem was Prime Minister of the Seychelles was a member. The South African

Eschel Rhoodie took very seriously the task given him by Prime Minister Vorster: to be the chief engineer in a war against the "worldwide psychological and propaganda" campaign being waged against South Africa by the rest of the world.

government also provided Menachem's political party with a full-color high speed printing press, according to Rhoodie, to help him get elected as Prime Minister of the Seychelles in the first place.

Another African recipient of secret Department of Information funds was J. Resampe, one-time candidate for Prime Minister of Madagascar.

But it was on Zimbabwe, at the time known as Rhodesia, that the South African government focused its most ambitious plans to intervene in the internal affairs of another African state. And, according to Rhoodie, a U.S. corporation—Allegheny Ludlum Industries—played a key role in the bribery and influence-buying scheme in that country.

In 1977, Andy Andrews, Vice President of Allegheny Ludlum Industries approached Connie Mulder with a proposition to secretly subsidize the careers of two black "moderate" politicians: Bishop Abel Muzorewa and James Chirereema. Andrews and Allegheny Ludlum wanted to support the two black leaders because top corporate officers believed them to be the least likely to ban the export of Rhodesia's chrome. At the time, Allegheny Ludlum imported most of its chrome from Rhodesia.

Andrews told South African officials

that if the Department of Information would secretly provide \$1 million to Muzorewa and Chirereema, Allegheny Ludlum would invest \$4 million in South African industries of the South African government's choosing.

The South Africans did indeed pass the money along to Chirereema and Muzorewa, through the the Swiss bank account of Chris Schofield, Allegheny Ludlum's representative in Rhodesia. (Schofield would on a later occasion be of use to Rhoodie. It was through Schofield's Swiss bank account that the Department of Information would funnel \$50,000 to Ret. Lieutenant General Dan Graham's Miami-based Institute of Policy Studies.)

In Norway, the Department of Information provided secret funding to Anders Lange, a right-wing Norwegian politician and businessman, to enable him to launch a new political party in that country—which, of course, would have a favorable disposition towards South Africa. Much to the surprise of the South Africans, the new political party won four seats in the Norwegian parliament. That would lead Owen Horwood, South Africa's Finance Minister to joke, according to Rhoodie, that if they pumped enough funds into Lange's political party, it would become Norway's majority party, and someday rule the country.

It was in the United States, however, that the South Africans launched their most ambitious attempt to influence the internal affairs of a foreign power, particularly with the funneling of \$450,000 into the Senate campaigns of S.I. Hayakawa and Rodger Jepsen.

Rhoodie's Department of Information also acted as an intelligence agency in another fashion. It recruited individuals who later served as intelligence agents for South Africa. Among those recruited were two members of Great Britain's Parliament. Rhoodie says they were not paid, "large amounts, I think, by American standards. The one got 3,000 pounds per year and the [other] one got 5,000 pounds."

One of the more interesting aspects of South Africa's influence-buying program was the Department of Information's secret subsidization—sometimes in part and sometimes in full, of academic organizations around the world. A number of those organizations were based in the United States, or carried out operations in the United States.

Rhodie later explained his government's involvement in such programs:

Connie Mulder was strong on [a] state of affairs...in which the opinion formers and decision makers abroad often did not understand [South Africa]. He realized that attempts at rationalizing South Africa's policy in terms of outdated intellectual concepts were generating more heat among foreign observers when what was required was not more heat but more light. Mulder also grasped the fact that the "eggheads," the academics, wielded as much influence behind the scenes in Washington, London, Paris and other capitols of the western world as businessmen, the generals of the army, and the politicians. Over a period of three presidencies, it was men from the universities, Sorenson, Rostow, Kissinger, Brzezinski, and MacNamara who wielded the most influence. It was studies on South Africa by experts at various universities which found their way to Congressional desks and into the State Department.

One academic organization entirely subsidized by the South African government was the Institute for the Study of Plural Societies at the University of Pretoria in South Africa.

From October 23 to 25, 1978, the Institute held a "Conference on Intergroup Accommodation in Southern Africa" held in New York City. Among the prominent American academics who attended the conference—apparently unaware that it was being secretly subsidized by the South African government—were Professor Seymour Lipset, Professor of Political Science at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, Ralph Barbanti, a prominent political scientist at Duke University; Dr. Ray Cline, a former senior CIA official currently with the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University; Dr. William Schneider of the Hudson Institutes; and Dr. Richard Segat of the Carnegie Endowment.

Another academic organization secretly subsidized by the South African government—as confirmed by Rhodie and another South African official—was the London-based Foreign Affairs Research Institute (FARI).

One of the main activities of FARI was coordinating attacks among conservatives against the World Council of Churches—which South Africa considered to be one of its most effective adversaries on the international political scene. Geoffrey Stewart Smith, head of FARI, published a book in 1979 entitled "The Fraudulent Gospel," which attack-

ed the World Council of Churches. Unknown to the public was the fact that publication of the book was secretly subsidized by the South African government.

In June 1978, FARI co-sponsored a conference in Brighton, England with the CIA-connected Institute for the Study of Conflict. Among those who attended was Richard Mellon Scaife, a conservative Pittsburgh businessman who has contributed more than \$100 million to conservative political causes in recent years. Also attending the conference was William Casey, who would later be ap-



The color line remains in South Africa, upheld by the military and police force of the state.

pointed Director of the CIA by President Reagan.

From July 30 to August 2, 1981, the South African-subsidized FARI held a second major conference in Kent, England. According to an internal FARI memorandum, written by Geoffrey Stewart Smith, conference participants from 26 countries met:

To consider the need of the entire non-communist world to respond to the Soviet global political and military threat. . . the [conference] certainly played a useful part in starting to try and formulate a global security alliance adequate to withstand the power of the largest military war machine the world has ever seen.

President Reagan—apparently unaware that FARI was secretly subsidized by South Africa—sent the conference a "message of good will." Three Reagan administration officials also attended the conference; they included Richard Pipes, then an aide on the National Security Council and William Middendorf, then and currently the administration's am-

bassador to the Organization of American States (and mentioned previously in this story, as a member of the Board of Directors of the Panax Corporation, during the time it received \$11.3 million in laundered South African funds to buy the *Washington Star*, *Sacramento Union*, and other American newspapers).

The third Reagan advisor to attend the 1981 FARI conference was Ret. Lt. General Dan Graham, formerly the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Graham has had other longstanding connections to Rhodie's department.

Earlier he had taken an all-expense paid trip to South Africa financed by the South African Freedom Foundation, a wholly subsidized front group for the South African government. In 1978, Graham spoke at and received an honorarium for speaking at a conference in Washington, D.C. sponsored by the South African Foreign Affairs Association, another South African front organization.

More important, however, is the fact that Graham himself was the recipient of secret Department of Information funds. In 1977, according to Rhodie, the South African Department of Information passed along \$40,000 to Pat Woop, an official with the Americans Concerned with South Africa, a pro-South African lobbying group, who then passed along the funds to Graham's Miami-based Institute on Policy Studies to complete an "independent" study showing the strategic importance of South Africa. Rhodie personally handled the transfer of funds to Woods, utilizing the Swiss bank account of Chris Schofield,

Continued on page 45

South Africa's GOLDEN ARMOR



BY ROBERT SHEPHERD

Since the achievement of black majority rule in Zimbabwe, the Republic of South Africa has stood alone: the last bastion of white minority rule on the African continent.

The country's segregationist racial policies, based on the doctrine of *apartheid*, continue in full force despite cosmetic changes by the Pretoria government and well-publicized attempts by outside pressure groups to influence the internal policies of the South African regime. Resolutions have been passed by the United Nations and individual governments calling for a trade embargo against South Africa. Cultural and sports links have been severed in the last decade between the majority of the world's nations and South Africa. And concerned groups in the United States have pressured American corporations to withdraw capital invested in South Africa by calling on individuals and institutions to divest themselves of stock in the approximately 330 corporations doing business in South Africa.

South Africa remains unchanged. The real effect of the various attempts to censure South Africa and impose an economic "embargo" has been nominal at best. In 1982, the total book value of American investment in South Africa fell from \$2.6 billion to \$2.5 billion—and even this small drop was due to the continued world recession, not divestment.

In a 1980 Ford Foundation study entitled "The Potential Impact of International Trade and Investment Sanctions on the South African Economy," Richard Porter pointed out that the South African economy's center of vulnerability lies in its ability to import, not in capital flows. As long as the country can continue to pay for required imports, it will remain immune to outside pressure. And South Africa possesses the one commodity that—next to oil—all industrialized nations desire: gold.

The Republic of South Africa is the largest gold producing nation in the world. It is, in fact, the world's only gold-based economy. Johannesburg, the industrial and financial center of the country, sits amidst the Witwatersrand, the richest gold ore producing area the world has known. South Africa's transportation, communication and industrial sectors have grown up around the 'Rand' in the 20th century.

Half the world's annual production of gold comes from South African mines, over 70 percent if you exclude Soviet sources. In 1982, the 21,355,111 troy ounces¹ mined brought South Africa in \$8.1 billion in revenues. In contrast, the second leading producer, the Soviet Union, was estimated to have mined 8 million troy ounces, or just over one-third South Africa's total.

The sale of gold overseas has helped Pretoria withstand the global recession

of recent years, while many other nations were battered by severe economic problems. Although, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, South Africa registered its first negative growth rate from late 1981 through 1983 of between 1 percent and 3 percent, this was primarily due to a long regional drought which cut the annual grain harvest by 66 percent, from 9.9 million to 3.3 million metric tons. South Africa, normally a grain exporter to the rest of southern Africa, was forced to import 2 million metric tons of corn in 1982.

South Africa's manufacturing sector, which historically has received state protection from foreign competition, has had its share of problems, with production decreasing between 1981 and 1983. Because the apartheid laws limit non-whites' access to job training and education opportunities, most industries suffer from a shortage of skilled labor. Advanced technology and heavy machinery must still be imported, draining foreign exchange. And since South African manufactured goods cannot compete in the world market against better produced and cheaper foreign goods, large deficits usually pile up in South Africa's trade balance.

The foreign exchange earned by gold sales is thus critical to the continued survival of the South African regime, enabling it to resist attempts from abroad to limit South African access to the international economy. Possessing a commodity all nations desire, South Africa has been

able to purchase the technology, machinery, raw materials, energy supplies and luxury goods needed to defend the apartheid system and maintain the whites' high standard of living despite a disorganized and highly inefficient economy.

In fact, an economic recession has been averted in recent years solely because of export earnings from the gold industry. In 1982, the South African economy recorded a trade balance surplus of R 704 million, followed by a surplus of approximately R 4 billion in 1983.² In both years gold accounted for roughly 50 percent of total exports. Without gold, the country would have been in much the same position as most of the rest of the non-industrial nations: forced to borrow to pay its bills. For South Africa is not an industrial state but a commodity economy, dependent on agricultural productivity and mineral production. Unlike other commodity economies, however, South Africa's dominant commodity is a valuable mineral, on which the country holds a near monopoly.

Gold in South Africa is very big business. Because of the nature of gold-bearing ore found in the Witwatersrand region, large sums of capital have been required to develop and maintain a mine. Gold is found in layers of quartzite formations, rather than in the nuggets, veins or alluvial deposits discovered in California and Australia during the great gold rushes of the mid-19th century. This has prevented the development of Hollywood's familiar image of gold mining: the solitary gold miner panning for nuggets of gold. In Witwatersrand, tons of ore must be mined and crushed in order to produce the smallest amount of gold. In 1982, it took 267.7 million tons of ore to produce 21.3 million ounces of gold, a yield of only .32 ounces per ton.

Since gold was first discovered in 1886, the industry has been organized around a few large conglomerates. The gold industry today is controlled by six mining firms through interlocking directorships, joint ownerships and a monopoly on the supply of technological and administrative expertise and capital.

The largest company, the Anglo-American Corporation, is also the biggest corporation in South Africa, earning a net profit of \$534.9 million in 1983. Three of its subsidiaries also rank in the top twenty-five of South African companies: Anglo-American Gold Invest-

ment Corporation is ninth, Anglo-American Industrial Corporation ranks eleventh, and Western Deep Level Mines is twenty-first. Between them, the three earned a net profit of \$447 million in 1983.

Anglo-American, involved in two-thirds of total gold production, has *direct control* of 40 percent of South Africa's annual gold output. Its closet rivals are Gold Fields of South Africa, the only firm with a major shareholder outside the Republic (Consolidated Gold Fields, of London) and GENCOR, an amalgamation of the Federale Mynbou Beperk Investment Company, the Gold Mining and Finance Corporation and the Union Corporation. Together, these three companies control the output of 29 of South Africa's 37 major gold mines. The remainder are controlled by three "smaller" mining corporations—Barlow Rand, Anglovaal and Johannesburg Consolidated—which are the fifth, nineteenth and twentieth largest companies in South Africa, respectively.

All the gold mining companies work in

close cooperation with each other, both in management and marketing. For example, Anglo-American owns 27 percent of Consolidated Gold Fields, which in turn controls 48 percent of Gold Fields of South Africa, Anglo's main rival.

Interlocking directorships are numerous. J. Olgilvie Thompson, the deputy chairman of Anglo, is a Director of Consolidated, as well as Chairman of Anglo Gold Investment. D.A. Etheredge is a director of Anglo, Gold Fields of South Africa and East Driefontein Consolidated. Etheredge is also President of the President Steyn and President Brand Mining Companies. Robin A. Plumbridge, chairman of East Driefontein, is a director of Consolidated Gold Fields and the Newmont Mining Company. Newmont, a U.S.-based gold-mining company with business ties in the South African industry, owns Palabora Mining Company in South Africa.

In 1899, the mining companies created the Chamber of Mines in an attempt to apply uniform pay rates for native African workers. The Chamber then

In this icy world, gold warms her heart.

Seductive ads such as these peddle South African gold to Americans without mentioning that the advertiser, International Gold Corporation, is closely tied with the apartheid regime.

Nothing else feeds like real gold.

18 KARAT GOLD



created the Wiatersrand Native Labor Association, a recruiting organization charged with providing enough African labor for the mines to prevent "costly" competition for scarce local labor. Today, the Chamber of Mines represents, besides the gold industry, over 100 uranium, copper, diamond and platinum mining companies. Although it now lobbies on behalf of all the Republic's mineral interests, the Chamber still takes a special interest—and plays a powerful role—in the gold industry.

The Chambers' Gold Producers Committee, composed of one member from each of the six mining firms, oversees the marketing of gold bullion and coins in close cooperation with the South African Government. From the mines, gold ore is sent to the Rand Refinery, Ltd., in Germiston. There it is refined, assayed and purchased by the Reserve Bank of South Africa. The Reserve Bank sells the gold on the international bullion market, except for approximately 100 tons each year, which are supplied to the South African mint for the striking of Krugerrands.

The Chamber of Mines created the Krugerrand in the mid-1960s as part of an effort to increase gold sales in the world market. By a special amendment to the Mint and Coinage Act, Pretoria agreed to give the coin, one ounce of fine gold, legal tender status. In 1971, the Chamber formed the International Gold Corporation "to stimulate the use of gold in industry and especially in jewelry." Intergold Corporation became the world marketing outlet for Krugerrands in 1973.

Since then, Intergold has spent over \$200 million advertising the pleasures of gold ownership in the industrialized nations of Europe and North America. Intergold's marketing techniques, including ads in trendy magazines, have been quite successful: the Krugerrand is far and away the best selling gold coin in the world. By 1980, 33 million fine ounces of gold, worth over \$13 billion at today's gold price, had been sold.

The impact of the gold industry on the South African economy is difficult to gauge, it is so enormous. Gold is literally the lifeblood of the country with 21 percent of state revenues coming from the industry. Hundreds of thousands of jobs are connected to the gold mines, in transportation, heavy industry and the service industry.

Gold is literally the life blood of South Africa, providing 21 percent of State revenues. Yet black miners are severely underpaid.

Jody Seymour

The gold mines directly employ 487,000 workers—90 percent of whom are black migrants on fixed contracts. These migrants are forced to live in labor compounds away from their families in the "homeland" areas or urban shantytowns. White mineworkers earned an average of \$932 per month in 1980 while blacks received \$168, or around 20 percent of white wages. The gap has fallen since 1973, when black wages averaged only \$23.50 a month, less than 5 percent of the average \$451 per month white wage.

Both black and white wages have increased since then largely because of the astronomical rise in the world gold price: from \$42 an ounce in 1973 it rose to a peak of \$800 per ounce in 1979 and settled at its present level of \$375 to \$400 an ounce. Because of this huge increase in revenues, the mining companies raised wages at little cost to themselves.

Higher black wages have also been necessary in order to attract South African blacks into the mines. Before the 1970s, it was difficult for labor recruiters to hire blacks from the Republic because of the low wages and poor working conditions. Instead, the majority of the migrant workers came from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi, where alternative labor opportunities were scarce. But since the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and the subsequent increase in support of guerrilla activity aimed at South Africa, labor recruiters have turned to more politically "stable areas." Today, 88 percent of the black mineworkers come from South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, with the other 12 percent from Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe.

How has gold retained its economic power? From the end of World War II until the late 1960's the monetary role of gold was generally assumed to be at an end. The dominant economic power, the United States, in concert with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, both post-war creations of the American reconstruction effort, maintained a fixed price of \$35 per ounce of gold. President Franklin Roosevelt had arbitrarily set the price of gold at this level in 1935, after gradually raising it from \$20.47 per ounce in hopes of stimulating economic recovery.

The United States maintained the fixed price through a simple measure: any government or central bank that wished

The demise of the gold standard was an enormous boon to the South African economy. The price of gold began to rise, which naturally benefited its principal producer.

to purchase gold could do so from the U.S. Treasury. But this strategy could work only so long as global confidence in the American dollar remained intact.

If the dollar was considered "as good as gold," banks and governments preferred to use it as an international currency, since it was much easier to transport, store and exchange than bullion. But by the late 1960s, the United States was amassing huge deficits as the government tried to both fight the Vietnam War and expand social programs at home. As confidence in the dollar's stability fell, purchase of Treasury gold increased, led by France.

In an attempt to halt the run on Treasury gold, a two-tiered gold price was established in 1967: the "official" price of \$35 per ounce and a "free-market" price, allowed to float on the open market. Finally, in 1973 President Nixon took the United States off the gold standard, devaluing the dollar and allowing the gold price to float on the open market, much like any other commodity. The U.S. Treasury no longer sold gold on demand and in 1974-1975, U.S. restrictions on the private ownership of gold were lifted.

The demise of the gold standard was an enormous boon to the South African economy. With the world recession caused by the oil crisis of 1973, the price of gold began to rise, which naturally benefited its principal producer. The value of annual South African gold output increased from 775 million Rand in 1967, to 2.56 billion Rand in 1974, to over 10 billion Rand in 1982. The actual production of gold did not rise appreciably; in fact, in some years it fell below pre-1967 levels. But the huge in-

crease in price added millions of ounces of gold to South Africa's demonstrated reserves, gold that previously had been unrecoverable due to high costs.

Besides its historic role as a long-term store of value, gold today has a number of strategic applications. Gold plays a small but highly critical part in electronic devices and computers. Because it never rusts, corrodes or decays, gold is a vital component of military electronic equipment and turbine engines, insuring dependable operations under all conditions.

In the last decade, in part because of the Chamber of Mines' International Gold Corporation's publicity campaign, gold has shed its traditional, non-speculative role and become an investment tool for individuals and commercial institutions, much like stocks and bonds.

Gold has regained its place in the international monetary system because of the inability of the United States, the IMF and the World Bank to convince the rest of the world to accept either the American dollar or the IMF's Special Drawing Right as a replacement for gold. The Special Drawing Right is a quasi-currency, its value based on a market-basket of industrial nations' currencies and made available to members of the Fund as loans.

As of 1983, proven and probable world gold resources, according to the U.S. Bureau of Mines, total 2.4 billion troy ounces. South Africa possesses 1.28 billion, over 50 percent of the total. The Soviet Union controls 450 million troy ounces, 18.4 percent of resources. With the two leading producers controlling two-thirds of the world's gold and enormous initial capital outlays required to develop a productive gold mine, it will be extremely difficult to shift to alternative sources other than South Africa and the USSR.

For the West, support of the South African government is an economic necessity, insuring the uninterrupted supply of key minerals, particularly gold. Gold export earnings will continue to enable Pretoria to ignore economic and political sanctions aimed at the reform of the South African economic and social system. ■

¹The troy ounce is equal to 31.1 grams, or 1.097 avoirdupois ounces.

²At present, the South African unit of currency, the Rand, is worth U.S. \$0.7825, or 1 U.S. dollar equals 1.27 Rand.

CHANGING COURSE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

*A commentary on U.S. policy in the region
by Josh Cohen.*



Earlier this year, PACCA—Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America—published a report entitled “Changing Course: Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean.” There are two broad concerns that frame the background of “Changing Course.”

First, like many other Americans—both North Americans and Central Americans—we are firmly opposed to current U.S. policy in Central America. We believe that that policy is immoral and that it is moving on a trajectory leading to further escalation and invasion—a trajectory with increasingly disastrous human consequences. In an admittedly conservative accounting of costs, one group of analysts recently estimated that an invasion of Nicaragua, together with continued economic and military support for other countries in the region, would cost \$16 billion over the 1984-1989 period, would result in 2,000-5,000 Americans killed, 9,000-19,000 wounded, and would require U.S. occupational forces of one-and-one-half divisions to remain in Nicaragua for at least 5 years. About Nicaraguans, the analysis says only that their casualties “are likely to be very much higher.”

Our second concern is that only one obstacle stands in the way of a continuation of U.S. policies and their escalation, and that is American public opinion. Two aspects of this merit attention. First, the bad news. We are trying to engage in and encourage others to engage in a *preventive action*, to stop the escalation before it goes any further. And we recognize that there are considerable difficulties in mobilizing large numbers of people under such circumstances. The good news is that we are certainly far better off in this respect than we were in the early 1960s. In 1962, when 13,000 American troops were in Vietnam, there was no anti-war movement of significant size and power. Now, by contrast, there is a movement, there is broad public scepticism, and—whatever its shortcomings—Congress is trying to exercise some independent initiative in the area of foreign policy.

The question that we face, then, is: can we consolidate this concern, this scepticism, this opposition, and effectively redirect U.S. policy toward Central America before more damage is done? I think that the answer to this question is: yes, but that doing so will require more than just criticism of current policies. As

in other policy areas, we need an *alternative* that states what we think is *right*, and not just criticisms of what we know is wrong. "Changing Course" presents such an alternative. It offers an analysis of the problems that beset Central America, and makes specific policy recommendations in the framework of a set of basic principles that ought to guide U.S. foreign policy everywhere.

First, then, let's consider the analysis. There are, I believe, two basic approaches to understanding Central America. Neither is correct in every respect—they are too oversimplified to be exactly right—but one is basically right, and the other is basically wrong. Each can be summarized straightforwardly.

First, there is the approach underlying Reagan administration policy. Its most clear statement can be found in Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick's 1979 article in *Commentary* magazine, "Dictatorships and Double Standards"—the article that won her the post of U.N. ambassador:

"Because the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people who, growing up in the society, learn to cope. . . ." In view of this willingness of those inside "traditional" societies to tolerate unlimited pain, suffering, and humiliation, it follows, as the night follows the day, that conflict and revolution must come from outside these societies, from "external" forces.

Finally, what is required to handle conflict is to eliminate the external threat, thus restoring order. A model of restoration is provided by El Salvador, 1932, when 30,000 Salvadoreans were killed, and about which Ambassador Kirkpatrick said: "To many Salvadoreans the violence of this repression seems less important than that of the fact of restored order and the thirteen years of civil peace that ensued."

That's one view of the problem. PACCA's view is very different. PACCA agrees with Ambler Moss, U.S. ambassador to Panama in 1980, who said that: "What we see in Central America today would not be much different if Castro and the Soviet Union did not exist." And with the Latin American bishops who said at Medellin in 1968: "Latin America faces a situation of injustice that can be called institutional violence. We should not be surprised, therefore, that the 'temptation to violence' is surfacing in Latin America. One should not abuse the patience of the people."

More specifically, PACCA's position

is that:

For most Central Americans, life is miserable and unfair, or, as Thomas Hobbes said, "nasty, mean, poor, brutish, and short." According to a United Nations study of 1981, nearly half the population lives in "extreme poverty." The distribution of income is grossly unequal: the richest 5 percent of the population take nearly one third of national income. In Nicaragua before the 1979 revolution, the bottom 50 percent of the population had an average per capita income of \$286 per year; one in eight infants died before they were one year old; and 80 percent of the rural population lacked sufficient land to produce their own means of subsistence.


Like citizens of Poland, Chile, or the United States, Central Americans will try to change miserable and unfair conditions. In short, PACCA rejects the central premise of the Kirkpatrick position—that people in "traditional societies are willing to tolerate unlimited insults to their human dignity."

While considerable economic growth took place in Central America between 1950 and 1978—an average annual increase in real GNP of 5.3 percent—this growth did little to improve the miserable

and unfair conditions. The reason lies in the basic model of growth: the production of agricultural goods (bananas, cotton, coffee, sugar, etc.) for export, and not for internal consumption.

The political system and the military are largely concerned to protect the privileged beneficiaries of the agro-export model. The result is that there are no real avenues of reform open to the people when, as in the early 1970s, they do act to change their miserable and unfair conditions. Rather, reform efforts typically lead to repression, and further efforts lead to terror. This combination of miserable and unfair conditions, a model of growth that fails to ameliorate these conditions, and a political order closed to reform makes the countries "ripe for revolution."

Finally, there is the role of the U.S. Some U.S. interests are the beneficiaries of these systems of exploitation. In any case the American government has consistently provided the ultimate guarantees for regimes of institutional violence through a variety of programs, ranging from covert action, to direct military intervention, to the steady provision of support and training for the military—e.g. the 5700 members of



Somoza's National Guard trained by the U.S. between 1950 and 1980. Indeed, the Rockefeller Report of 1969 stated that U.S. support for Latin American police and military forces "will bring the best long-term hope for the improvement of the quality of life of the people." Of course, lip service has always been paid to the importance of reform—from the Alliance for Progress, to the Kissinger Commission Report, to the speeches of President Reagan. But the rhetoric of reform has always disguised a reality of repression.

I have briefly summarized the PACCA analysis. What does this analysis suggest about what U.S. policy in Central America should be? First of all, PACCA holds that any policies should embrace the following general principles: (1) peaceful dispute resolution; (2) self-determination and non-intervention; (3) equitable development; (4) support for human rights; (5) encouragement of democratic values; (6) consistency with the *genuine* security interests of the citizens of the United States.

But in stating these principles, we must be careful to avoid excessive rhetoric. The central issue is not the statement of principles, but how they are interpreted in light of the analysis of Central America, and how they are embodied in policies. The Kissinger Commission report, for example, agrees with all of these principles. But its emphasis on "security interests" ensures the continuation of a policy of subordinating equitable development and reform to military support for existing regimes that have shown no interest in reform. PACCA's recommendations reflect its analysis of the internal sources of conflict and revolution. They emphasize equitable development—the needs of those at the bottom—and the legitimacy of diverse, alternative paths of national development.

To be more specific, our short term recommendations are:

1. In El Salvador, the Kissinger Commission recommends more military aid and no power sharing. PACCA recommends no military aid for the current regime, and calls for power sharing.

2. In Nicaragua, the Kissinger Commission calls for continued covert action, continued support for the contras, and continued credit pressures through multilateral lending agencies. PACCA calls for an end to covert action, an end to support for the contras, and an end to the credit blockade.

Can we effectively redirect U.S. policy toward Central America? We need an alternative that states what we think is right, and not just criticisms of what we know is wrong.

3. In Honduras, the Kissinger Commission supports the U.S. military buildup; PACCA opposes it.

4. In Guatemala, the Kissinger Commission calls for military assistance; PACCA says no military assistance.

Thus PACCA agrees with a senior leader of the Salvadoran Christian Democrats, who complained that the Kissinger Commission "places too much emphasis on the military aspect."

What about the longer term? Here I will briefly review a few of the main PACCA Proposals for U.S. assistance for independent, national equitable development:

1. *Debt*: PACCA calls for a program of renegotiation of debt from shorter term to longer term, and from high interest loans to low interest loans. And, it calls for a change in IMF policies on conditionality, policies which now effectively condition the availability of credit of austerity programs for the poor.

2. *Trade*: Here there are two broad recommendations. First, that special duty-free treatment be given to imports from those countries in the region—for example, Nicaragua—that are overcoming gross inequality and promoting food production, rather than just more agro-exports. Second, that a program of price stabilization be instituted for basic agricultural exports, thus reducing dependency on world market fluctuations.

3. *Aid*: PACCA recommends that aid be provided to governments that are respon-

sive—in their policies, not just in their rhetoric—to the demands of the poor, that encourage—in deed, and not just in words—participation by the poor in defining the terms of the development process, and that encourage—in fact, not just in theory—diversification of the economic base.

Changing Course" provides an outlook on Central America that is *broad and regional* in scope, *long term* in perspective, and *reasonable and realistic* in its recommendations. Above all, PACCA's proposals represent a *positive vision* and a *real choice* for U.S. policy in the region. The proposals are practical, and they are principled. They reflect a sound understanding, and a clear sense of justice. Their heart is best captured in remarks made by the Colombian novelist—author of *100 Years of Solitude*—Gabriel Garcia Marquez. In accepting his Nobel Prize for Literature, Garcia Marquez returned to the theme of Latin American solitude:

The immeasurable violence and pain of our history are the result of age-old inequities and untold bitterness, and not a conspiracy plotted 3,000 leagues from our homes. But many European leaders and thinkers have thought so, with the childishness of old-timers who have forgotten the fruitful excesses of their youth as if it were impossible to find another destiny than to live at the mercy of the two great masters of the world. This, my friends, is the very scale of our solitude.

He continued by expressing his belief in a utopia:

A new and sweeping utopia of life, where no one will be able to decide for others how they die, where love will prove true and happiness be possible, and where the races condemned to one hundred years of solitude will have, at last and forever, a second opportunity on earth.

By moving forward on the basis of the alternative course PACCA has proposed, we can begin to overcome our own one hundred years of solitude from the people of Central America.

This commentary is drawn from testimony which Josh Cohen, an associate professor of philosophy and political science at MIT, presented before the Massachusetts State Democratic Committee's Commission on Central America.



TUFTS UNIVERSITY: STUDENTS COUNTER SPIES

BY JOHN ROOSA

When the director of the CIA's regional recruiting office visited Tufts University in Medford, Mass. the night of October 3, he received a surprise. Twenty-five students staged a non-violent direct action. Stopping him from speaking at what had been advertised as a CIA "informational meeting." The protestors formed a human wall between the CIA recruiter, Stephen L. Conn, and the students who had come to hear the presentation. Conn told a Tufts newspaper reporter that such sessions had "occasionally" been met with protests on other campuses, but that this was the first time that students actually "prevented us from giving the presentation."

The Tufts administration reacted by calling the protestors before a disciplinary panel. The protestors in turn defended their action, using the hearing to publicize CIA crimes and denounce Tufts' policy of allowing the Agency to recruit on campus. In arguing before a supportive audience of about 90 people that their action was justified, the students noted that under Tufts' disciplinary guidelines persons are punished only when their actions have breached the "standards of the community," so that any decision would be a political judgement on what those standards are. They argued further that the administration, not the students, was

violating the "standards of the community" in allowing the CIA on campus.

Faced with this defense, the disciplinary panel chose not to discipline the students but at the same time stated that the protestors had violated university rules.

After the disciplinary process was over, the protestors met with three deans and confronted them with specific university policies violated by the CIA's campus recruitment activities. The deans, deciding that some important points had been raised and knowing that the CIA was not planning to return to Tufts until at least the following semester anyhow, temporarily suspended CIA recruitment of undergraduates until a panel of deans could determine if university policies were in fact being violated.

After the protestors issued a press release on the deans' decision and the actions of October 3, the Associated Press, National Public Radio and other national and local media picked up the story. The *Boston Herald*, the local Rupert Murdoch paper, was outraged enough to run a lead editorial titled: "Tufts Wimps Out with Its CIA Ban."

The next day Tufts president Jean Mayer rescinded the temporary suspension. In a written statement, he denied that CIA recruitment had ever been banned, explaining that "any policy on recruitment must be a *University policy*, not policy of an individual school." One dean told protest leaders that Mayer had been pressured to take the action after receiving complaints from Tufts trustees.

Privately Mayer admitted, "It would be difficult pragmatically and ideologically for Tufts to ban agencies of the federal government from its campus."

Mayer's decision is easily explained. Although a small school, Tufts sends a large number of students each year to the CIA.

A 1981 survey by Tufts' student newspaper reported that twelve undergraduates had been interviewed by the Agency during the previous year, four had received offers, and two had accepted jobs. Even more recruiting takes place at the university's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, an institution Mayer himself acknowledges to have a "hawkish reputation." As America's oldest graduate school of diplomacy, Fletcher has been an important training center for future Foreign Service officers. The last three U.S. ambassadors to El Salvador—Thomas Pickering, Deane Hinton and Robert White—are Fletcher alumni, as are five other current ambassadors, several high-level State Department officials and over 250 other officers. At the same time, Fletcher is also an important training center for potential CIA employees. The most recent Fletcher alumni book lists nineteen graduates who acknowledge currently holding positions at the Agency. Probably an equal number of graduates have left the CIA over the last decade while others hold deep cover positions and can-

not admit their true employer.

Documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act show that there are high-level ties between Fletcher and the CIA related to recruitment going back to at least to 1972. In that year, according to letters and memos, Fletcher officials took great pains, in preparing for the school's annual Washington "placement trip" for graduating students, to include the CIA on the group's itinerary. Recruiter Harry L. Russell reported to Langley that Fletcher Dean Edmond Gullion and Assistant Dean Larry Griggs "are extremely happy about having their students invited to the Agency and are quite honored." Wanting not to pass up such a good opportunity to cultivate two important university administrators (as well as potential student recruits), the Agency arranged an unusual two-hour briefing by top-level officials.

Over the next four years, Fletcher officials apparently developed ever closer ties with the CIA—with the CIA reciprocating by recruiting for Fletcher. In late 1976 an undergraduate at one New England college, recruited by the CIA for its summer intern program, was encouraged by his Agency contact, recruiter Charles R. Pecinovsky, to consider attending Fletcher. Pecinovsky then arranged for Fletcher's Larry Griggs, whom he described in a letter as a "working acquaintance," to send the student admissions material. At the same time, Griggs and other Tufts personnel were receiving free research materials from the

Agency. As the Tufts newspaper noted in reporting these gifts, "the CIA has been known to provide nonpublic information to academics for use in their work, increasing their prestige and promotion prospects, and sometimes their sense of obligation to the Agency."

It is easy to see why CIA recruiters would seek ties to Fletcher and encourage students to go there. Fletcher's faculty includes a handful of present and former government officials, some of whom have held posts requiring high security clearances. Material from their courses would be useful in intelligence work, while their backgrounds could help them spot students with potential talent for such work. Such professors include:

- William Griffith, who also teaches at M.I.T., was the main CIA liaison at Radio Free Europe until 1958, when he left to join M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies, then sponsored and partially funded by the CIA. Griffith's International Communism project and his M.I.T. salary were paid by the CIA until the mid-1960's. He continued to be a consultant for the Agency thereafter. At Fletcher, he teaches courses on radical and communist theories and practice.
- Richard Shultz was a research associate with two CIA-linked think tanks, the National Strategy Information Center and Roy Godson's Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, before his recent ap-

pointment at Fletcher. The Fletcher catalog reports that he is also "a consultant to various U.S. government agencies concerned with national security affairs" and that his professional interests include "U.S. foreign and national security policy, contemporary military strategy, intelligence and national security, unconventional war and power projection in the Third World, and propaganda and political warfare." The CIA's projection of power into the Third World formed the basis of the students' criminal charges against the Agency. His most recent book, written with Godson, is *Dezinformatia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*, and his contribution to the national security section of the Heritage Foundation's blueprint for the second Reagan term is currently receiving much press attention. At this time, Shultz is conducting a Fletcher seminar on intelligence methods.

- John Roche came to Fletcher from Brandeis in 1973. Before that he had served as a special consultant to Lyndon Johnson—in part, he says, "dealing with disinformation with the great North Vietnamese 'peace offensive'"—and as a member of Richard Nixon's commission, headed by Milton Eisenhower to oversee the removal of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty from CIA control. During his first four years at Fletcher, he served on the Board for International Broadcasting, overseeing Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty operations.
- Leonard Unger, who came to Fletcher after retiring from the Foreign Service, had been deeply involved in U.S. war planning for Indochina—as Ambassador to Laos (1962-64), as chairman of the State Department's Vietnam coordinating committee (1965-67) and as Ambassador to Thailand (1967-73). In Thailand, he is known to have supervised the counterinsurgency operations.
- Hewson Ryan was deputy director at the United States Information Agency during the Johnson Administration, and later, under Nixon, became U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, where he played a relatively positive role supporting military reform, according to knowledgeable sources in




The Wall Street Journal

"That's a good question which demands some real evasion."

The Recruitment Process: Overt?

The CIA is known to engage at many universities in "covert recruiting"—secretly soliciting from faculty and administrators the names of American students potentially willing to join the Clandestine Services, and of foreign students potentially willing to join the Clandestine Services, and of foreign students potentially willing to spy on their countries, then surveilling these potential recruits without their knowledge to determine their value to the Agency. Whether this practice goes on at Tufts is not known; Tufts officials and faculty members have denied that it does in the strongest terms.

Whether it does or not, the documents released by the CIA demonstrate that at one time there was, at the very least, insensitivity to the appearance of possible covert recruiting. In the mid-1970's, for example, Assistant to the Dean Mary Von Bibber was a CIA recruitment contact at Fletcher even while she was also the International Student Adviser. Similarly, the CIA at some point obtained from Fletcher a breakdown of the 1972-73 student body by several categories, including country of origin. Although there is no evidence either that



The CIA gives this "fact book" to professors and students to further recruiting efforts. The manual plays up the Agency's academic side.

Von Bibber mixed her two roles or that the student body information was ever put to use by the Agency, these revelations create the kinds of doubts that Tufts officials have been at pains to allay.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the CIA's ordinary recruiting process at Tufts—a supposedly "overt" process—is in many ways covert. Documents concerning "overt" recruitment at Tufts were heavily sanitized by the CIA before being released. At a certain stage of the interview process, applicants to the

Agency are required to sign a "secrecy oath," pledging not to reveal details of the process. The most basic facts are kept secret, like the location of Stephen Conn's Boston office (in Room 409A of the John F. Kennedy Federal Building). CIA recruiters reveal little or nothing about their backgrounds. At the Tufts "informational meeting," cameras were banned. Another CIA man accompanying Conn was never identified, nor would he give his name to reporters afterwards.

Though Conn and other recruiters emphasize the analytical, academic side of the CIA, evidence suggests that Conn, for one, may once have been in covert operations. His name first appears in government publications in the late 1960s when he was described as a military attache at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow—the only military attache there listed without a rank. The State Department's *Biographical Register* indicates that he joined the Department in August 1969 at the late age of 37 but, untypically, supplies no other personal information. Conn was sent to Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in June 1970 and to Bogota, Colombia, in June 1975. Whether these were real or cover assignments is unknown.

Tegucigalpa. Since leaving the Foreign Service and coming to Fletcher in 1977, he has headed the Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy and taught courses on propaganda and on Central America. At the Murrow Center, he replaced Philip Horton, a former CIA Officer and the long-time editor of the now-defunct CIA-funded magazine, *The Reporter*.


- Theodore Eliot joined Fletcher as dean in 1979 after retiring from the Foreign Service, and has since been appointed Professor of Diplomacy. Though Eliot had never published, Tufts officials are said to have been more interested in the clout Eliot had accumulated over his long career, especially as inspector general of the Foreign Service from 1978 to 1979. He replaced Edmond Gullion, who had also enjoyed a long Foreign

Service career (including a 1961 stint as Ambassador to the Congo). Gullion had been serving with Roche on the Eisenhower Commission at the time of the 1973 Fletcher placement trip to the CIA.

Another faculty group at Fletcher consists of those who specialize in strategic studies and who, though they have not necessarily served in government, are nonetheless well-known in government circles. They are affiliated with Fletcher's Program in International Security Studies and with a think tank associated with the school, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Their courses, too, would be useful to students wanting to enter the intelligence community. Uri Ra'anen heads the Fletcher program, and Robert Pfaltzgraff heads the Institute. The two, who have collaborated on several books, served on

Ronald Reagan's advisory team on foreign policy and intelligence during the 1980 campaign, although they insisted they did not want government posts. One strategist who did join the Reagan Administration was W. Scott Thompson, a former assistant to the secretary of defense, who took the post of associate director for programs at USIA at a time when that agency has been increasingly used for propaganda and political-action projects that might in earlier times have been carried out by the CIA.

It is very likely that some of these Fletcher faculty members are active consultants for the CIA. The Agency's current Coordinator for Academic Relations, Ralph E. Cook, is after all himself a Fletcher alumnus. The CIA documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, which run only up through 1978, confirm that several Tufts political scientists did have consulting relationships with the Agency at least during the mid-1970's. One was former Fletcher



professor Geoffrey Kemp, who left to join the National Security Council in 1981. The documents reveal that Kemp was paid \$1250 to attend a CIA conference on nuclear proliferation in October 1978. "That was an academic exercise," he told the Tufts newspaper. "Very rarely are they on classified subjects. I have participated in several of these."

The Agency was embarked on a campaign at that time to improve its standing with universities, which had been in decline ever since Congress had begun its inquiries into CIA activities in 1974. Kemp's conference was part of that effort. Another part was a series of meetings by CIA Director Stansfield Turner with university presidents. It was at this time, Tufts President Jean Mayer says, that the Tufts president met "his good friend" former CIA chief Stansfield Turner, who has since joined Mayer on an advisory board to Monsanto Corporation. Soon afterward, CIA tried to forge financial ties with Tufts. Turner offered the school an undisclosed sum of money for a research project on world famine—an offer perhaps made to impress Mayer, who is a nutritionist by profession. In 1978, the CIA also offered \$100,000 to \$200,000 to assist a Fletcher international economics class studying the impact of the then newly discovered Mexican oil fields.

Mayer rejected both offers. He said that the Agency link, which would have been open, would have made "much of our work abroad very much more difficult."

Fletcher has been eager however to take money from the two foundations most active in recent years in publicly promoting the need for a strong CIA. One of them, the Scaife Foundation (together with the closely linked Scaife Family Charitable Trusts and Allegheny Foundation) has provided the largest part of Fletcher's foundation backing since 1977, donating over \$1.5 million. The other, the Smith Richardson Foundation, contributed over \$100,000 from 1979 to 1981 for two projects it describes as a "project on [the] history of Vietnamese communism" and the "completion of [a] study of communist propaganda and political warfare." Since 1978, these two foundations have also provided most of the private funding to Pfaltzgraff's Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Scaife alone donating over \$500,000.

The promotional efforts of the CIA by these foundations, consisting so far of at least eleven separate projects together costing over \$500,000, appear to have begun on October 30, 1978, when Scaife president Richard Larry phoned Ernest Lefever (an IFPA "research consultant") to ask if his Ethics and Public Policy Center at Georgetown University would supervise a study of media treatment of the CIA and the KGB. Work that resulted in the pro-CIA collection by Lefever and Roy Godson, *The CIA and the American Ethic*.

Six months later, Scaife sponsored a conference of Fletcher's International Security Studies Program entitled: "Intelligence: Deception and Surprise." In

attendance was an assortment of scholars and former spies, including Reginald Jones, Director of British Scientific Intelligence during World War II; former CIA officer Thomas Latimer, staff director of the House Intelligence Committee; former CIA Director William Colby; former Czech intelligence officer Ladislav Bittman (contributing the obligatory exposition on KGB "active measures"), Richard Perle, soon to be Assistant Secretary of Defense; and Harvard's Richard Pipes, a CIA consultant who soon afterwards joined the NSC.

Fletcher programs also receive corporate support, with most of that support for the International Security Studies Program coming from four companies which hold intelligence-related government contracts: Raytheon, EG&G, Hughes Aircraft and United Technologies. The first three have representatives on Fletcher boards; their presence gives the companies a say in school affairs. Raytheon has a particularly close relationship with Fletcher. The maker of missiles, electronic-warfare devices and other military products, Raytheon is represented by its former chairman, Charles Adams, on both Fletcher's board of Visitors, where he is chairman, and on IFPA's Board of Directors. Adams is also a trustee emeritus of Tufts. Philip Phalon, a Raytheon senior vice president, sits on the Advisory Council to the International Security Studies Program. Theodore Eliot, in turn, is a Raytheon director.

Just as there has been no known funding by the CIA at Fletcher, there are no

current CIA employees known to be on its boards. Still, some members have former ties and many are supporters of a strong CIA. Besides Adams, the Board of Visitors includes Gerald Blakeley, lone-time business partner of CIA lawyer Paul Hellmuth; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee; Hadyn Williams, president of the former CIA proprietary, the Asia Foundation; former CIA employee Joseph Sisco; Henry Cabot Lodge, the former ambassador to South Vietnam; and Winston Lord, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and former top aide to Henry Kissinger. Besides Phalon, the 19-member Advisory Council to the Program in International Security Studies includes former CIA analyst William Bundy; Stansfield Turner; former CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman; U. Alexis Johnson, long-time member of the 40 Committee, the CIA oversight group of the NSC; R. Daniel McMichael of the Scaife Foundation; Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway, a former Scaife trustee; Reginald Jones; Rear Adm. Jonathan Howe, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; Ret. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster; Robert Everett, president of the CIA-linked MITRE Corporation; Charles Wilcox of Hughes Aircraft; and Ret. Adm. Elmo Zumwalt. With

members such as these, the complaints to Mayer over the temporary CIA recruitment ban should come as no surprise.

There is evidence, in fact, that many connected with Fletcher see the opportunity the school offers for jobs with the CIA not only as a right of students (as Mayer has argued) but as a national duty as well. Robert Pfaltzgraff contends, for example, that "the idea of courses in intelligence in schools of international affairs, and especially in professional schools, emerges from the consideration of the needs of the intelligence community set forth [at the Fletcher intelligence conference]."

Despite its many CIA ties, Tufts does not have any formal guidelines governing those ties. A number of universities established such rules in the wake of congressional revelations in the 1970's about abuses in the CIA's academic relationships. Tufts was not one of them. "We will evolve a [comprehensive policy] out of practical experiences," Mayer told the Tufts newspaper in 1981, "but at this point any rules would be premature. It is understood [though] that if people are approached by intelligence groups of any kind, they should report it to the President. We don't want our professors to be arrested as spies."

But even without specific guidelines, CIA recruitment currently violates several Tufts policies. The university's Student Handbook states: "Tufts exists in a larger society and provides no immunity from city, state or national laws. The university will not play the role of policeman ferreting out crime. But neither will the university serve as an accomplice."

The CIA is currently in violation of the Neutrality Act, the War Powers clause of the Constitution, the Boland Amendment (prohibiting the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government), other statutes and several treaties. Even former CIA Director Stansfield Turner has acknowledged that the CIA is in the business of breaking the law. He used this fact in his argument against the Reagan Administration's proposal to permit CIA covert operations inside the United States.

The principles of the College Placement Council, principles to which Tufts adheres, requires recruiters to "honor the policies and procedures of individual institutions" and for organizations to take responsibility "for the ethical and legal conduct of their representatives throughout the recruiting process." Despite this, the CIA conducts covert recruitment, involving surveillance of students, and fails even to conduct "overt recruitment" openly (see box). While Director, Turner noted candidly, "If I were required to abide by the rule of . . . every academic institution in the country . . . it would become impossible to do the required job of our country."

Several Tufts deans in their discussions with protestors acknowledged the validity of these arguments. Mayer's decision to rescind the ban on recruitment was not based on Tufts rules, however, but on "pragmatics" and "ideology." The case of Tufts and the CIA illustrates how some universities have sacrificed their independence and academic freedom for the chance to become servants of the state. Even now, Fletcher is making plans for its annual Washington placement trip in January 1985. Once again, the CIA is likely to be included on the itinerary.

Despite the wide student opposition to CIA recruitment and the initial promise of a consideration of the matter on its merits, there is now little likelihood that the CIA will be banned from the Tufts campus, no matter what its foreign atrocities or domestic abuses. Tufts' powerful patrons have spoken. ■

John Roosa is a student at Tufts University.

Collegiate Protest Spreads

Protests against CIA recruitment activities have occurred at two other universities in the wake of the Tufts episode. On November 14, three CIA representatives suddenly became the subjects of a mock trial by members of the audience when they tried to give a recruitment presentation at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. One student protester, playing judge, read off a list of charges against the CIA. The three recruiters, including CIA employee Andres Vaart, were subsequently escorted (one news report says "chased") out of the building and to their automobiles by the students.

On November 26, more than 300 Brown students confronted Stephen Conn and another CIA representative, engineer and Brown alumnus Roger Sampson, when they tried to give presentations. After someone in the audience blew a whistle, about half the 150

students who were crowded into the small Brown lecture room joined in a citizens' arrest of Conn and Sampson. The recruiters were read a long list of charges and then allowed to leave.

Unlike the Michigan case, Brown officials took a hard line against the protesters. Vice president Robert Reichley said after the action that students had been warned in advance that "such activity would not be tolerated." A list of 67 names given voluntarily to university officials by student protesters was turned over to Brown's University Council for disciplinary action. Brown is well represented in the CIA "old boy" network (former Brown president Barnaby Keeney was employed by the Agency during his tenure in the 1960's). It is possible that administrators fear a backlash from alumni unless they show some muscle.

—J.R.

LAUNCHING THE U.S.S. HONDURAS

BY JOHN KELLY

"There is real evidence that our military is building airfields and other infrastructure to support a very large and possibly permanent U.S. military contingency there [Honduras]."

—Senator James Sasser (D —Tenn.)

A secret General Accounting Office (GAO) report lays bare the Pentagon's massive preparations for war in Central America. The report details the escalation in U.S. Military policy and build-up in the region under the guise of conducting exercises and maneuvers in the region.

According to the report: "On September 19, 1980, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, recommended that the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] provide more assertive direction to the joint exercise program by defining the thrust of the program over a 5-year period. . . In April 8, 1981 response, the JCS approved new procedures which included the derivation of exercise objectives from [U.S.] national military strategy, provided for an assessment of exercise results against those objectives, and delineated a more effective role for the JCS throughout the entire process." In short, U.S. exercises in Honduras became a top priority, placed on the front burner—in accordance with the U.S. national military strategy.

Training for War

The subsequent U.S. maneuvers in Honduras had all the markings of a military occupation and build-up. The training provided to the Honduran military was of the type and extent used to prepare any army for war. Ordinarily, the Pentagon provides minimal training so that the joint forces can work

together. The Pentagon refers to this as inter-operability. But the training revealed in the GAO report was over and above the needs of inter-operability. And under the guise of the exercises, the Honduran military obtained this training free, without going through normal funding channels. This point is underscored in the following description of the training provided in the GAO report.

"(1) The U.S. Military personnel assigned to the 41st Combat Support Hospital at Comayagua provided three 5-week combat medic training courses for approximately 100 Hondurans. As a result, a planned combat medic Mobile Training Team (MTT), to have been paid from security assistance funds appropriated for Honduras, was cancelled.

"(2) Personnel of the 3rd/319th Field Artillery at Puerto Castilla provided 3 to 4 weeks of instruction to two Honduran battalions on 105 mm artillery prior to a combined firing exercise with U.S. troops. (During this period, Honduras took delivery of its first artillery pieces under a Foreign Military Sales case.) At the combined firing exercise, we observed crews of 8 to 12 Hondurans being supervised and instructed by teams of two to four U.S. artillerymen, half of whom spoke Spanish and translated corrections of Honduran efforts on the guns. Spanish speakers were deployed separately from Ford Ord to assist and participate in the instruction. According to the U.S. Military Assistance Group (MILGRP) in Honduras, if exercise personnel had not trained the Hondurans, the Hondurans would have had to pay for an MTT in artillery training from their security assistance funds at an estimated cost of \$250,000 to \$500,000.

"(3) The U.S. Special Forces located at San Lorenzo provided basic and/or advanced classroom and field training in fire direction procedures and mortars, and counterinsurgency tactics to four Honduran battalions. The training of

one battalion in mortars and counterinsurgency tactics that we observed at San Lorenzo was the same as is provided by security assistance funded MTTs and at the Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) in Honduras. Similar training at the RMTC cost Honduras about \$2 million."

In addition U.S. military personnel began training Hondurans in 1984 in anti-tank barrier techniques. "Since November 1983", adds the report, "and thus prior to the combined field training exercise with the Honduran engineering units, elements of the U.S. 46th Combat Engineers had been independently digging anti-tank ditches in the Choluteca area, as close as 5 kilometers to the Nicaraguan-Honduras border."

Again, this was training and unilateral U.S. military activity over and beyond any inter-operability needs of the exercises. It was also in excess of Honduras' defensive needs since the country is not in danger of being attacked by tanks. The GAO ultimately decided that the training "was essentially the same as that ordinarily provided through security assistance"—and thus over and above interoperability needs.

In defending its training, the Pentagon revealed that it had placed U.S., as well as Honduran troops, on a wartime footing. As the GAO reported: the Department of Defense (DOD) "emphasizes that training of Honduran troops contributes to the readiness of U.S. forces, by exercising the U.S. role of 'force multiplier' by permitting U.S. troops to improve their professional skills in bilingual environment, and by exposing U.S. forces to indigenous cultures."

Minimum essential facilities (MEF) are those defined by the U.S. Air Force and NATO as critical for the wartime operation of aircraft, that is, fuel storage, munitions storage, and dispersed parking. By definition, Palmerola airfield in

Honduras is right now ready for wartime operations.

The House Military Construction Subcommittee also found Palmerola ready for wartime operations. The subcommittee reported that it was built as "a contingency access facility should the U.S. Air Force be assigned missions in the area."


A base access agreement for U.S. contingency use of Palmerola and two other airfields in Honduras has been signed. And, the agreement only requires prior approval by the Honduran government for the U.S. to use the airfields. Prior approval is a foregone conclusion. For the subcommittee reported that "it was clear from discussions with local [Honduran] officials that the present government of Honduras, especially the Armed Forces, would approve U.S. access to the bases in most circumstances.

The Aquacate air base in Honduras, constructed during exercises by the U.S. 46th Combat Engineers, has also been raised to the MEF level. It was "left behind for use by CIA personnel" according to the GAO and U.S. Southern Command officials. The CIA is using Aquacate to supply and assist the contras in their wartime operation against Nicaragua. According to some reports, Aquacate is even used for bombing runs against Nicaragua.

At the time of the GAO report, the U.S. was planning the construction of facilities at San Lorenzo and around the Palmerola airbase of Comayagua at estimated costs of \$2.5 million and \$1.5 million respectively. These were storage facilities for pre-positioned ammunition, bridging materials, anti-tank mines, demolition supplies, medical supplies, and rations for use by soldiers engaged in wartime operations. In January 1984, the U.S. Southern Command under General Paul Gorman proposed that these supplies meet the "Pre-positioned War Reserve Stocks" level. This level was opposed by some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but was still being pushed by General Gorman who has usually prevailed in Central American matters.

At least one wartime operation was carried out by the Pentagon. The GAO report said that: "A member of the Joint Task Force (JTF-11) Command told us... that on one occasion DOD personnel/aircraft were used to transport ammunition for the CIA." This ammunition was for the CIA's contras in their wartime operations against Nicaragua.

Prior to the U.S.—Honduras exercises, massive construction and the leav-



ing behind of facilities and equipment was unheard of. The GAO report said that: "JCS officials said that the Bright Star series of exercises in Southwest Asia most closely compare with the AHUAS TARA [Big Pine] exercises [in Honduras]. The Commanding General of the U.S. 3rd Army, which participated in Bright Star 83, told us that only very minor construction occurred during the Bright Star series and that no U.S. constructed structures were left in the exercise areas."

The GAO report also noted that "it appears that, except for the NATO exercises, the leaving behind of facilities, materials, and equipment during AHUAS TARA II [Big Pine II] is a significant departure from past practices." The report added, "Military officers who previously participated in training exercises in Europe, South Korea, Southwest Asia, and Central America told us that the standard practice is to leave nothing behind at the end of an exercise. . ."

Spotted by Radar

As part of the military build-up, the Pentagon—again under the guise of the exercises—installed two radar systems. Among other things, these radar facilities reportedly direct CIA planes used to transport and supply the contras and to bomb Nicaragua. The secret GAO report pro-

vides a detailed description of the radar facilities.

"Under two exercises, two radar systems have been deployed to Honduras for an indefinite period of time. . . In October 1982, the [U.S.] survey team identified requirements for a total air defense system and Air Force (USAF) equipment and personnel required for interim radar capability until Honduras could procure a radar system via FMS (Foreign Military Sales). In December 1982, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed deployment of the AN-TPS-43E radar and USAF personnel for up to 2 years. In February 1983, under the AHUAS TARA I exercise, the U.S. Air National Guard deployed personnel and radar equipment to San Pedro Sula to support the exercise. At the termination of the exercise, the radar did not redeploy to the United States but was placed in storage at Tegucigalpa, Honduras. In May 1983, it was moved to Cerro la Mole (12 nautical miles southeast of Tegucigalpa and became operational. A second radar system, a U.S. Marine Corps AN-TPS-63/65, was deployed under the same Ahuas Tara II to Tigre Island, Honduras. It became operational in November 1983. Both radars were under the same USAF South Operational Order (83-5) until December 2, 1983. At that time, the CINCSOUTH directed that both radars, along with other operational assets, come under the operational control of the JTF-11 Commander...

"Much of the Cerro la Mole (TSP-43)

site preparation and construction was provided by Honduras. . . The [U.S.] O&M [Operations and Management] expenses for the TPS-43 radar, including expenses of the USAF personnel who operate it, are paid for with Air Force O&M funds. They are identified under Emergency Special Project Code "AA". Expenditures under this code for fiscal year 1983 and the first quarter of fiscal year 1984 totaled \$1,573,443. Total fiscal year 1984 expenditures are expected to be between \$2 million and \$3 million.

"The Honduran military owns and controls the radar location and the Air Force Operations Center, which receives

cises) for general support to both U.S. and Honduran military (CLASSIFIED MATERIAL DELETED) activities."

Despite all the evidence documented in the GAO report of war preparations and expensive training and equipment handed over to the Hondurans, the Pentagon downplayed its activities. "The [Defense] Department justified all 'engineering work,' civic action, radar installations, etc., as incidental to the exercise program. According to DOD, no formal training for Honduran troops took place, and any support services provided to Honduran soldiers would have been incurred in the absence of Honduran

ed announcing exercises in advance.

After inquiries by the press, Lt. Colonel Lake provided the following breakdown of current exercises in Honduras:

- A company of about 120 engineers from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, are building roads at Palmerola and "resurfacing and building dirt airstrips."
- A company of 150 to 180 infantry troops from Fort Hood, Texas are conducting patrolling exercises in the vicinity of Palmerola.
- A contingent of approximately 12 personnel are providing "command and control" from ports in El Salvador and Honduras as part of a naval exercise called "King's Guard." A U.S. ship was also scheduled to participate with the local navies in the Gulf of Fonseca which borders Nicaragua.
- A U.S. Air Force exercise involved A37 attack planes from the Pennsylvania Air National Guard and O2A observation planes from Howard Air Force Base in Panama. These planes used the airfields at Palmerola, La Mesa, and San Lorenzo.
- Special Forces [Green Berets] from Fort Bragg and Fort Gulick, Panama were conducting counterinsurgency exercises with Honduran troops. Lt. Colonel Lake refused to give the number of Green Berets involved.
- Army preventive medicine teams are being continuously deployed for two-week tours at the Palmerola hospital.
- Lake added that there are additional U.S. military personnel in Honduras not involved with the exercises. They are operating a radar station, the hospital, a training camp and other facilities, and flying military intelligence missions.



U.S. troops land in Honduras. Are these military exercises, or preparations for war?

continuous tracking data from both radars. Seventy-five Honduran military personnel guard the radar site. The TPS-43 radar equipment and facilities are manned and operated by 65 U.S. Air Force personnel.

"U.S. Marine Corps personnel both man and secure the TPS-63/65 radar at Tigre Island. The 46th Combat Engineers, under the exercise, prepared the site. Unlike the TPS 43 site, there are no Honduran personnel located at the facility. Marine Corps expenditures for operation of the Tigre Island radar totaled \$665,000 through December 31, 1983.

"Together, the TPS 43 and 63 radars provide complete flight following/monitoring capability to include routes of unidentified aircraft originating in Nicaragua and landing in El Salvador. The TPS-43 has a detection range of up to 240 nautical miles and altitudes up to 100,000 feet. The TPS-63/65 radar covers a narrower range and lower altitudes than the TPS-43 and serves as a gap-filling radar for low altitude flights over the Bay of Fonseca. This data is transmitted to the Honduran Air Force Operations Center."

In a later report, the GAO noted that the two radar facilities have been "used extensively (both during and after exer-

participation. DOD also described all exercise construction projects as temporary in nature."

The "Exercises" Continue

In November 1984, the Pentagon had no fewer than 7 military exercises going on in Honduras.

Three of these began the day after Reagan's re-election. And, a fourth began the next day. In reference to the exercises, Pentagon spokesperson, Michael Burch, charged that Nicaragua had "designs" on Honduras and El Salvador. And that the U.S. would "respond with whatever assistance was necessary" if Nicaragua attacked. But he admitted that "there is no hard evidence that they [Nicaraguans] plan to invade El Salvador and Honduras."

Pentagon officials denied before Reagan's re-election that they were planning to escalate military exercises in the region. However, Lt. Colonel Richard Lake reported that there were more exercises taking place in November 1984 than at any time since May 1984. The Pentagon has also become more secretive about the exercises. Under General Paul Gorman's order, the Pentagon has ceas-

What's Next?

A recently declassified Pentagon report requested \$28 million in 1986 projects for Honduras including a medical facility and two projects identified only as Southern Command Facilities Numbers 3 and 4. It is widely believed that either or both of these facilities are to be permanent U.S. bases in Honduras.

A staff report of the House Military Construction Subcommittee stated that:

"In general, the staff delegation [touring Central America] did not find enthusiastic support anywhere on the isthmus for a permanent U.S. military base. The only significant support came from elements of the Honduran business community who see such a facility as a necessary element in the development and safety of their country."


The report added that: "The staff delegation found a significant level of fear and anticipation that the regional conflict could accelerate. Neither the Contadora process, nor the missions of [U.S.] Ambassador Stone were given much chance to succeed in an atmosphere of military escalation such as would be the case if the United States established a permanent base in Honduras. . . the proposed permanent Puerto Castilla port-airfield complex (believed to be the Pentagon's unidentified facility 3 or 4 planned for 1986) would be viewed as a destabilizing element in the regional conflict. . ."

The *Washington Post* recently reported U.S. plans for a new exercise to begin in December 1984. Known as King's Guard, it was to involve the movement of U.S. troops into El Salvador. The Pentagon immediately denied that U.S. ground troops would move into El Salvador as part of King's Guard. While the King's Guard "maneuvers will send U.S. forces into El Salvador", said the Pentagon, they will only be for "command and control" of the naval exercise.

The *Post*, however, quoted unidentified U.S. officials who contradicted the Pentagon's denial. These officials said that U.S. ground forces might enter El Salvador under the guise of the exercise for the purpose of training Salvadoran troops at La Union. The Pentagon has trained Honduran troops under the guise of exercises there. Through this ruse, the Pentagon has circumvented Congressional funding procedures. Thus, it would fit an established pattern for the Pentagon to train Salvadoran troops under the guise of an exercise. It should also be noted that the Honduran government recently stopped the Pentagon from training Salvadoran troops in Honduras.

The *Washington Post* also obtained a copy of U.S. Air Force accounting instructions which listed Pentagon plans for major exercises in Central America in 1985. The exercises are to be known as Big Pine 3, Granadero 2, and Bigger Focus 84. The *Post* reported that: "The aim of that presence [U.S. exercises] is to help the Salvadoran government win its

While defending its exercise program in Honduras, the Pentagon revealed that it had placed U.S. — as well as Honduran — troops on a wartime footing.



civil war against leftist guerrillas and to help CIA-backed 'contra' rebels pressure the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, officials said."


In the past, the Pentagon has denied any connection between the Honduran exercises and the war in El Salvador or support for the contras. The Pentagon did not deny the *Post's* recent assertions, even though it denied other parts of the same *Post* report.

Subsequent to the *Post* report, more than 100 U.S. Military officials convened in Tegucigalpa to plan 1986 exercises. A

Honduran military statement said that the exercises would include troop training and engineering and civic-military exercises by units ranging in size from 9-150 personnel. Also included will be reconnaissance training in the area of Choluteca and the training of special forces by U.S. Army Rangers near Morocon. Both areas are within 20 miles of Nicaragua. Still, the Honduran military statement said that "these exercises have no intention of creating an atmosphere of psychological warfare with Nicaragua or any other country." ■

IN REVIEW

Central America: The Roots of Rebellion



by Andre G. Kuczewski

Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America by Walter LaFeber. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1983, 357 pages.

"Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal. . . Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions."

—Aristotle

"Revolutions are not made; they come. A revolution is as natural a growth as an oak. It comes out of the past. Its foundations are laid far back."

"In revolutionary times the rich are always the people who are most afraid."

—Gerald White Johnson

For longer than posterity can accurately record or remember, successive generations of Latin Americans have become acquainted with a popular traditional saying which holds that their social and political problems are the result of being "so far from God and so close to the United States."

Walter LaFeber heartily agrees. In his

elegant and highly readable study, *Inevitable Revolutions*, the author critically examines the one-sided relationship between the United States and the five nations which collectively make up the geographical region of Central America, namely, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua. LaFeber locates the roots of Washington's experience in Central America from the announcement of James Monroe's famous doctrine in 1823 to Ronald Reagan's recent allegations that an international communist conspiracy, financed by Moscow and Havana, is preparing a massive terrorist and subversive campaign to destabilize the region.

LaFeber does not mince words when it comes to presenting his thesis. He has no use for those who interpret the present crisis in that part of the globe as a Soviet and Cuban plot against United States strategic and economic interests. Dismissing *in toto* the argument that evil Bolsheviks in the Kremlin are responsible for the events which have spawned rebellions in the era, LaFeber insists that the real "reasons for this struggle between the Goliaths and Davids of world

power. . . lie deeply embedded in the history of U.S.—Central American relations." In fact, during the past 150 years, "the U.S. system ironically helped cause revolutions in Central America" by virtue of its conscious decision to work hand in hand with an indigenous "military-oligarchy complex" that benefited the greedy few at the expense of the deprived many.

The U.S. system was not designed accidentally or without well-considered policies. It developed slowly between the 1820's and 1880's, then rapidly, reaching maturity in the 1940's and 1950's. It was based on principles that had worked, indeed on principles that made the United States the globe's greatest power: a confidence in capitalism, a willingness to use military force, a fear of foreign influence, and a dread of revolutionary instability.

The current United States administration's self-serving claim that Soviet Russia is stirring up trouble in Latin America is nothing more than the latest chapter in a long saga of tried and proven rhetoric which conveniently obscures the actual nature of the difficulties plaguing the region. Ever since President Monroe warned the European powers to keep out of the Western Hemisphere, the United States has strictly adhered to a counter-revolutionary foreign policy that reacts belligerently to any legitimate attempts at changing the *status quo*. On several occasions in the nineteenth century, for example, Washington and London almost came to blows when jealous British leaders made repeated efforts to challenge America's selfishly guarded sphere of influence. When England finally gave up on the idea and grudgingly accepted the uneasy concept of United States military and economic supremacy in Latin America, Washington further increased its progressively tightening control over the region. By the 1980's, millions of investment dollars were flowing into Latin America, creating an asymmetrical economic system dominated by giant American monopolistic enterprises—principally banking, plantation, railroad and mining concerns—and a compliant local elite eager to co-operate with Uncle Sam. Peaceful attempts to change the distorted economic state of affairs for the betterment of the masses came to nothing. And

native armed insurrections to oust the United States were put down with the greatest ferocity.

Throughout the late nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth, the United States pinned the blame for these popular uprisings on the imported misadventures of Mexican bandits and intriguing schemes of Imperial Germany's fifth columnists. It was not until the mid-1920's, however, that American officials began to use communism to explain the spontaneous flurry of nationalist rebellions. That view, observes LaFeber, "tells too little too simply."

The ultimate tragedy of Washington's historical record in Latin America is clear. At no time did the United States question the morality of its privileged foothold in the region nor was there any serious attempt to honestly evaluate the long term political consequences of building an economic empire (with the help of home grown dictators and junior partners) on the backs of the rural and urban poor. The working classes were, unfortunately, expendable parts of a vastly intricate and impersonal machine that was unable to distinguish profit accumulation from human suffering and exploitation. Whether it was James Monroe, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, FDR, or Ronald Reagan, U.S. leaders callously closed their eyes to the squalor and injustice taking place within relative proximity of their own back yard. LaFeber has harsh words for this inexcusable policy of indifference. "Without exception," he sadly concludes, "U.S. Presidents did not care."

LaFeber ends his study by reiterating the position that nationalism, not international communism, fuels the revolutions which are hemorrhaging Latin America today. The same, of course, was true in the past when an "overwhelming number of Central Americans were in rebellion because their children starved, not because they knew or cared anything about Marxism." There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is attempting to curry favor with those who wish to overturn the present lopsided system. But this, to be sure, is something completely different from the interpretation which contends that Moscow manufactured the problem in the first place. That dubious credit goes directly to the United States which was trampling on Latin America a quarter of a century before Karl Marx penned the Manifesto for which he is best remembered. And almost fifty years before Lenin was even born.

Just how anyone could still accuse the Soviet Union of fomenting unrest in Latin America after having read Walter LaFeber's rich and illuminating analysis is uncertain. However it is obvious that the sands of time are rapidly running out for the United States. But notwithstanding the enormous gravity of the situation, there are still a few hours left to avoid a complete and disastrous blood bath. What will it take? Oliver Cromwell's advice to his contemporaries

offers a good starting point: "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken." ■

Andre G. Kuczewski is pursuing post-graduate research at McGill University in Canada. His articles and book reviews have appeared in Etudes Internationales, The Journal of Asian History, Monthly Review and many other professional and popular periodicals.


Harlem: More Than Just the Cotton Club

by Jack Colhoun

Communists in Harlem during the Depression, by Mark Naison, University of Illinois Press, 1983, 355 pages, hardcover \$22.95.

"No socialist organization before or since has touched the life of an Afro-American community so pro-

foundly," historian Mark Naison writes in the introduction to *Communists in Harlem during the Depression*. He might have added that no predominantly white political movement in U.S. history has made the struggle against racism an essential part of its political agenda and achieved the degree of success in organizing in Black communities across the country as the Communist Party did in



"You seem to fit in very nicely
around here, Bizzbee."

the 1930s.

Naison tells how the party evolved from a position of political obscurity in Harlem in the 1920s, to one of considerable authority during the turbulent years of the Depression. He chose Harlem because it was the largest Black community and most influential Black cultural center in the U.S., but also because Harlem was the "concentration point" for the CP's "Negro work." Naison's analysis of the Party's role in Harlem—which in the 1930s was the scene of unprecedented political protest—opens a window on a remarkable era in the history of the U.S. left.

Naison, an associate professor of Afro-American studies at Fordham University, is critical of the Party's work in Harlem. But as a former community organizer in Harlem, the Upper West Side and the Bronx in the 1960s and 1970s, Naison's chief concern is to illuminate the CP's experience, not to grind ideological axes. "The story of the Party in Harlem is in some measure the story of the rise and fall of a dream of human betterment," he observes. "To scrutinize the dream, while respecting the dreamer, is the historian's special challenge.

By the end of World War I, Jim Crow segregation had become as much of a fixture of life in the North as it was in the South. Blacks, streaming into northern cities from the rural South and Caribbean, were shunted into ghettos of deteriorating housing, few city services and inferior schools. Black workers, barred from most trade unions, were relegated to low-paying, unskilled jobs that offered little opportunity for advancement. Racist theories, which posited that Blacks were inherently inferior to whites, held sway.

The white left was not immune to this racism. "Socialists do not believe in the mixture of the races," the socialist "Appeal to Reason" opined. "Socialists believe in justice to the Negro, not in the social, but economic equality." Victor Berger, editor of the *Social Democratic Herald*, was more blunt: There was "no doubt that the Negroes and mulattos constitute a lower race."

Harry Haywood recalls in his memoir *Black Bolshevik* that the Young Communist League, which he joined in the 1920s, failed to understand the political significance of the struggle against racism. Haywood, one of the CP's leading Black theoreticians, explains: "There was a certain underestimation of the importance of the Black struggle

against discrimination and for equal rights." The Communists and the other white radicals, who tolerated racism among their ranks, viewed the Black liberation struggle as a secondary aspect at best of the overall class struggle, rather than as a revolutionary force in its own right.


Ironically, Soviet Bolsheviks had a fuller understanding of the special historic oppression of Black people in the U.S. than had the white U.S. comrades of the first Blacks who joined the Party in the 1920s. It took prodding by the Soviet Union and the Comintern before the CPUSA began to pay more attention to the role of racism among white Communists.

The Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in 1928 marked a turning point. The Sixth Congress defined Blacks in the U.S. as an oppressed nation concentrated in the so-called Black belt of the deep South, a nation with the right to self-determination. According to Congress documents, the CPUSA should "consider the struggle on behalf of the Negro masses. . . as one of its major tasks." The Comintern instructed the CPUSA to train "a cadre of Negro comrades as leaders. . . and make every effort to draw Negro proletarians into active and leading work in the Party." "White comrades must be specifically trained for work among the Negroes" and "the Negro problem must be part and parcel of all and every campaign conducted by the Party," the Congress stressed. Blacks were now regarded, theoretically, as the key ally in the struggle for proletarian revolution.

By the onset of the Depression, the Party had developed a Black cadre in Harlem. Naison notes, "After years of isolation and marginal appeal, Harlem Communists had an opportunity to prove that militant action and alliance with the white working class were the best ways to fight racial discrimination and solve Harlem's economic problems. At this point, however, most Black organizations—from the middle class integrationist National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association—saw capitalism as a positive fact of life. They also considered white workers as competitors if not enemies.

Harlem was devastated by the Depression, with nearly every family reeling from the most severe economic collapse in U.S. history. Unemployment rates in Harlem soared from rates one-and-a-half to three times greater than that of whites in the rest of New York City. Unemployed Blacks were thrown out into the streets when they failed to make their rent or mortgage payments. Bank failures, which wiped out savings, pushed the Black middle class closer to poverty. Black-owned businesses went under or had to struggle as never before for economic survival.

The Party set up the Harlem Unemployment Council in 1930 to mobilize Harlemites for hunger marches at City Hall and sit-ins at relief offices. Speakers at street rallies and indoor meetings bellowed out the CP line: unemployment in Harlem could be



beaten by united action with the white working class.

The CP's campaign to free the Scottsboro boys mobilized hundreds of thousands of white leftists from coast-to-coast and helped make Communists in Harlem a political force to be reckoned with for the first time. Nine teenage Black males were arrested in Alabama in 1931 on charges of raping two white women who had been traveling with them on a freight train passing through the state. After a short trial in Scottsboro, Alabama—in an era when Blacks were frequently lynched in the South—the nine were sentenced to death.


The Party, which called the Scottsboro trial a "legal lynching," took the lead in the struggle to defend the Scottsboro boys through the International Labor Defense in the courts and mass protests in the streets. A largely white crowd of 12,000 jammed a victory meeting sponsored by a CP-led coalition in the Bronx after the Supreme Court overturned the Scottsboro conviction in 1932. The Scottsboro campaign emphatically demonstrated to Harlemites that CP-led whites would rally to the antiracist struggle.

The CP played an integral role in launching the National Negro Congress (NNC) in 1935. The NNC exemplified the Party's "Popular Front" organizing efforts by bringing together Communists and noncommunists for mass protests to challenge racism, to fight against the growth of fascism and to build support for antidiscrimination struggles in organized labor. Plenary sessions at the NNC founding convention drew from 3,000 to 5,000 activists committed to mass protests as a means of gaining Black advancement.

When Benito Mussolini's fascist regime in Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935 Harlem Communists responded quickly.

Black nationalists appealed to Harlem's "race pride" in organizing opposition to Mussolini's aggression. The Party moved, however, to channel Harlem's outrage into an anti-facist rather than anti-white direction, and insisted on involving white leftists, especially Italian-Americans, in the struggle. A CP inspired Popular Front coalition mobilized 25,000 in August 1935 to march in protest of the invasion of Ethiopia, one of the biggest interracial demonstrations in Harlem's history.

The CP also gained respect in Harlem for its trade union work. The Party played an important role in building the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which made nondiscriminatory



hiring and organizing a priority. Thousands of jobs for Blacks opened up in Harlem in the 1930's as the result of pressure by Communists, left-wing trade unions and the liberal policies of the administrations of President Franklin Roosevelt and New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia.

The Party's work in the Unemployment Council, Scottsboro case and the struggle for nondiscriminatory unions proved to Harlemites that thousands of whites under Communist leadership were willing to make fighting for the special demands of Blacks a priority. These successes gave credibility to the Party's assertion that the white working class could be a strategic ally in the Black liberation struggle.

At the height of the CP's influence in Harlem in the late 1930's, more than 2,000 Blacks belonged to the Party. Individuals and Harlem organizations, critical of the CP's dogmatism regarding the Soviet Union, nevertheless respected the party's ability to organize white support for causes in Harlem and willingly worked with Party-led coalitions. The actual number of Blacks participating in CP-affiliated organizing efforts was considerably higher than the 2,000 who were card-carrying members of the Party.

"But for most Blacks involved in the Harlem Party," Naison concludes, "membership was short-lived and ambiguous in its political impact." He adds,

"The Party's bread-and-butter organizing, especially around housing, relief and education, commanded widespread respect among Harlem's poor, but the movement as a whole did not kindle the kind of emotional enthusiasm among the masses excited by the Garvey movement in its prime [in the 1920's]." In contrast, however, the great majority of Black artists and intellectuals in Harlem had regular contact with the Party, including well-known personalities such as Langston Hughes, Richard Wright and Paul Robeson.

Communists committed to interracial organizing in Harlem found themselves in uncharted political territory. On the one side, the Party faced political competition from middle class Black assimilationist organizations, which were politically hostile to the Soviet Union and the CP. On the other side, separatist Black nationalist groups, opposed to working alongside whites, struck a sympathetic chord in Harlem with their appeals to race pride and calls to build autonomous Black institutions and political organizations. Of course, Black churches also played an integral role in Harlem's political life.

Naison describes in detail the Party's interaction with these Black groups—from the stridently sectarian "Third Period" of the 1920's and early 1930's when competing Black organizations were denounced as being "social fascist," to the Popular Front era of the

mid-and late 1930's when these same groups were sought as allies. But he doesn't explore in much depth the basic political-philosophical differences between these differences to understand more completely the political and racial dynamics at play in Harlem. In this, Haywood's *Black Bolshevik* is a useful supplement.

The CP and Black middle class groups, such as the NAACP and the Urban League, had unity on the need for interracial political organizing. But the Communists faulted the political strategy of the integrationists and their white liberal capitalist backers for relying too much on working through the courts and legislatures to remove racist barriers to the full participation of Blacks in U.S. society. As Haywood puts it, because the assimilationists were "bound up with the maintenance of capitalism," they consistently sabotaged the "revolutionary struggle for Negro rights."

The Party concluded that the integrationists' power stemmed not from their economic position in Harlem but from their influence in community life, especially in the Black press and educational institutions. The assimilationists' ability to dispense liberal patronage and the prominent backing they got from liberal newspapers and politicians were also critical sources of the assimilationists' strength.

The CP in the 1930's shared a common commitment with the Garveyites and other separatist groups fighting racism with militant tactics, which the integrationists eschewed. But the Party concluded that "narrow nationalism," with its rejection of unity with the white working class, was objectively reformist. Haywood contends that Marcus Garvey's over-emphasis in the 1920's on "racial business enterprises," such as the Black Star Steamship Line and Negro Factories Corporation, resulted in the neglect of the impoverished Black masses. Haywood also notes that the Garveyite doctrines of separatism and inherent racial incompatibility actually led to alliances with racist bigots in the Ku Klux Klan and the Anglo-Saxon Clubs.

Haywood examines the contradictory dual class nature of the nationalist movements during the 1920's and the Depression years. There was a "grassroots nationalism" of the dispossessed ex-slaves of the South and the impoverished ghetto Blacks of the North. But he states that the influence of the black bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie frequently dominated separatist organizations, reflecting the in-

terests of "the small Black entrepreneur or the middle class professional whose market and sphere is confined to the ghetto."

CP theoreticians, such as Haywood, recognized the grassroots appeal of nationalism. The Party slogan of "self-determination in the Black belt" was an attempt to develop a revolutionary Black nationalism which could compete successfully with more narrow forms of nationalism. As Naison notes, however, the CP's self-determination doctrine failed to generate the degree of enthusiasm that Garveyites could among northern ghetto Blacks.

"From 1929 on," Naison writes, "being a Black Communist in Harlem meant meeting, studying, protesting and socializing with whites." The Party's insistence on interracial organizing put Communists at odds with a "powerful impulse," as Naison says, toward Black autonomy, creating "tension, confusion, curiosity and excitement."

The CP's policy shifts in response to twists and turns in Soviet foreign policy, Naison contends, also hurt the Party's effectiveness in Harlem. The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939, coming after the CP had distinguished itself by tying the antifascist struggle to the fight

against racism, had "a profound impact" in Harlem. Key Harlem allies were "deeply disillusioned" by the Pact and the CP began to lose its role "on the cutting edge of Black protest."

These political shifts gave credence to the Party's critics who branded the CP as a "Soviet agency" and an unreliable ally of Blacks, Naison says. Nonetheless, the Party continued to exercise considerable though diminished, influence in Harlem well into the decade of the 1940's.

The lessons to be learned from the example of the Party's organizing in Harlem are many. At a time when the Reagan administration has set the U.S. on a course of racist reaction at home and military intervention abroad, the need for Black-white unity in the struggle against Reaganism is urgent. It is to be hoped that *Communists in Harlem* will help stimulate interest and discussion about this unique chapter in the history of the U.S. left. ■

The writer, a historian and political activist, is co-chair of the National Committee Against Registration and the Draft (CARD). He was an editor of AMEX-Canada, the former magazine of U.S. draft resisters and antiwar GIs exiled in Canada during the Vietnam War.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S PROPAGANDA WAR

Continued from page 23

Allegheny Ludlum's representative in Rhodesia at the time.

Rhodie says he never had any direct discussion with Graham about the secret \$40,000 grant to his institute: "Nobody discussed with him [Graham] officially." Says Rhodie, "Woods probably talked to him about it and told him that he was going to get a grant, that Woods would find the money for him. The fact that the money eventually came from Switzerland and into an American bank and then from the American bank to Graham probably convinced Graham that the money was coming from a private source."

Another front group for the South African government—as confirmed by Eschel Rhodie, another South African official, and the Erasmus Commission—was the South African Foreign Affairs Association.

The Association was originally set up as a front for the South African government to bring members of Congress and their aides to South Africa. Since it is illegal for a foreign government to provide overseas travel to members of Congress or Congressional employees, Rhodie simply provided secret Department of Information Funds to frontmen and front organizations to do so.

The ostensible private funding of the Association seemed so convincing at times that even some State Department officials were unaware that it was being funded by the South African government. For example, a December, 1979 State Department cable states:

The Director of the Foreign Affairs Association, Cas Devillers, has requested Embassy assistance this morning in attempting to put him in contact with Congressman [Andrew] Young. [Later the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. and currently the Mayor of Atlanta.] Asking that [the] information be kept confidential for present. Devillers said the Foreign Affairs Association plans a conference in 1977 to which the Congressman will be invited. . . stressing [the] STRICTLY

PRIVATE NATURE of the Foreign Affairs Association, Devillers said the purpose in inviting Young was not to brainwash him in any way but to enlist [his] help in persuading the politicians of the need for fundamental change. [emphasis added]

When not luring Congressmen, Devillers, the director of the Foreign Affairs Association, also engaged in other activities, according to the Erasmus Commission. After using South African government funds to purchase a Mercedes Benz 280 for himself and the Association, "a new three litre BMW," and later a Mercedes Benz 230.

Strait-laced Afrikaners may have been shocked by corruption in the Department of Information. But the real scandal is in the government agency's secret activities. Propaganda, covert interference in foreign governments, buying agents—these were just part of a day's work. ■

Murray Waas is a freelance journalist based in Washington, D.C. and recipient of the H.L. Mencken Award for Investigative Reporting.

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
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